A CRITIQUE OF A. A. A. TERRUWE'S ADAPTION OF THOMISTIC PSYCHOLOGY TO THE THEORY OF NEUROSIS

A Thesis

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by

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CHAPTER I

THE INTRODUCTION

The Statement of the Topic of the Thesis

The subject of this thesis is the book, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology, written by Dr. A. A. A. Terruwe, M.D., of the Netherlands, and translated by Dr. Conrad W. Baars, M.D. The book is of interest because it establishes a connection between the practice of modern psychiatry and the speculative doctrines of rational psychology.

Dr. Terruwe's book in its American edition consists of four principal parts: an introduction to and summary of normal psychology, pp. 3-31, a discussion of neurosis and repression in general, pp. 32-68, a discussion of the particular types of neurosis and their therapy, pp. 69-143, and finally, several chapters on case histories, the prevention of repression, and the freedom of the will in the neurotic.

This thesis is concerned primarily with a critique of the first two parts of this book.

Dr. Terruwe and Her Work

The origin, utility, and style of the book

Dr. Terruwe is a psychotherapist who began her practice in the city of Neimegen, Holland, in 1945. She studied medicine at Utrect and in 1949 presented a doctoral thesis, of which this book is an expanded form, to the University of Leiden. In pursuing the studies leading to

her thesis, she was motivated by a dissatisfaction with the theoretical explanations which Freud had offered for his empirical observations concerning repression and by the difficulties she experienced in applying them to therapy. Her interest in Thomistic psychology had been kindled by an article written by Professor W. J. A. J. Duynstee, C.Ss.R., LL.D., and entitled "The Theory of Repression, Judged from the Thomistic Viewpoint."[1]

In Thomistic psychology she found principles which could be applied with results that were intellectually satisfying and therapeutically productive to the empirical data discovered by psychoanalysis. Indeed, by implementing principles from rational psychology, Dr. Terruwe was able to distinguish two different repressive factors in obsessive-compulsive neuroses, namely, fear and energy, and to discover the fear neurosis camouflaged by energy.[2]

In her own work Dr. Terruwe has been able to combine medical science and rational psychology, and in commenting on the gains which the two disciplines have to offer each other, she makes the following observations which are of encouragement and challenge to practicioners of either:

> For we must remember that rational psychology, too, is a science which is still in the stage of development. Its principles are based on the most elementary and most definite observations and they are incontestable, but there are many particular aspects which remain to be clarified and completed. For example, modern research in depth electroencephalography may contribute considerably to an understanding of the localization and function of the internal senses.
>
> In this work we proceed from those data of rational psychology which in our opinion have been well established. In the event that one cannot accept these data as having been definitely established, one can consider them at any rate as forming a rationally justified working hypothesis.[3]

Dr. Terruwe's book is a refreshingly lucid one, and this is a credit both to her diction and her organization. Although it is written for a professional audience, it is mercifully free of jargon, and the progression of thought is easy to follow. At times her language is anthropomorphic to an extent of almost lending substantial identity to various faculties and forces in behavior, and precision suffers as a result. But being tempted to imagine little men jousting inside the patient is preferable to being frustrated by terms that mask meaning.

Two problems of philosophy and psychology

Introduction. -- Two philosophical points bear mentioning here, although they do not alter the material content of the book. Reflecting a widely-held veiw of the relation of science and philosophy, Dr. Terruwe subscribes to the distinction of philosophical psychology, which is concerned with providing a rational explanation of the observed facts of mental life, from empirical psychology, which is concerned with determining the facts of mental life and the laws governing the relationship between these facts.[4]

The dichotomy of the theoretical from the positive science is contrary to the view held in some Thomistic quarters that the two are parts of the same science, unified by the same formal object. This theory on the unity of science and philosophy is evinced by Fr. Anicetus Fernandez-Alanso, O.P., in his article, "Scientiae et Philosophia Secundum S. Albertum Magnum."[5]

A second point is that Dr. Terruwe cautions the reader that her work is in the first degree of abstraction, notwithstanding the fact that

rational psychology, as usually treated in philosophy texts and as she understands them, is considered to be in the third degree of abstraction.[6] She distinguishes here between studying the phenomenal level of behavior and passing on to the analysis of the human soul, and therein lies an ambiguity. The soul, insofar as it and its activities involve concorporate existence, is properly considered in the first degree of abstraction and therefore in rational psychology, a part of natural science. The third degree of abstraction becomes involved when a critique of knowledge is undertaken, and this pertains not to rational psychology, but to critica or epistomology in metaphysics.[7]

The issue of where psychology or where the study of the phenomenal level of behavior and the analysis of the human soul fit into Thomistic philosophy is a complex and important one, because on the one hand, it involves the question of philosophy and the sciences, mentioned above, where Maritain and Fernandez-Alanso are adversaries, and on the other hand it involves the division of philosophy as controverted among scholastic authors. This introduces the names of men such as Wolff and Ramirez, and it implies the subtle difficulties found in the doctrine of abstraction in the works of St. Thomas, John of St. Thomas and Cajetan. These difficulties relate to the question of the objects of metaphysics and natural philosophy. The entanglement of these considerations is an obstacle for one seeking to understand how metaphysics, how the phenomenal and the ontological views, how the philosophic and experimental methods address human behavior.

An inquiry into these questions as treated by Thomistic writers, however, discloses the context of Dr. Terruwe's acceptance of the distinction between the phenomenal level from the study of the soul itself, and

it helps to clarify her process of relating empirical findings to Thomistic psychology. Ultimately, these questions are important because they concern the validity of the conclusions drawn by the various disciplines. Since conclusions depend upon the application of proper principles to questions, and access to proper principles means putting a given question into the correct discipline and then limiting the discourse of that discipline to what is properly within its scope, the study of the division of the sciences and the identification of their proper objects is of vital importance in the establishment of the truth.

Thomistic divisions of philosophy. -- Two Twentieth Century manuals of Thomistic philosophy exemplify the disagreement over what goes where in philosophy. Representing one division of philosophy is Hugon's Curus Philosophiae Thomisticae, editions of which first appeared about 1920. After treating logic in the first volume, it presents natural science in the second, and this study is divided into Cosmology and into Biology and Psychology, which together constitute the second part of the volume. In this part, after treating of vegetative and sensitive life, the author goes on to consider the human soul according to its substance, faculties, and operation. Then in the third volume, metaphysics is treated under two heads: Psychological Metaphysics and Ontological Metaphysics. The first part covers the intellect and its acts and the will and its acts. Various aspects of being are examined in Ontological Metaphysics. Hugon justifies this division of material by saying that being can be negatively immaterial, because it simply lacks determination by matter, and thus ontology considers the one, the true, and so forth. On the other hand, it can be positively immaterial because it exceeds the sensible order, and thus

psychological metaphysics studies the human soul and metaphysical theology studies realities above the human soul.[8]

By contrast, Gredt's Elementa Philosophia Aristotelico-Thomisticae, which appeared in various editions from 1899 to 1936, includes human psychology as part of natural science and distinguishes it from epistomology or critica, which it locates in special metaphysics. In commenting on this apportioning of material, the eminent Thomist Santiago Ramirez indicates its significance and its historical background:

> This concept of philosophy and the traditional assigning of the proper formal object to each one of its parts, has produced two important results with the publication of this work: first, to restore to ancient Physics, not only Cosmology, but also Psychology, even in its treatment of the intellective soul, from which the Scholastic Metaphysicians after Wolff had unjustly taken them. Secondly, to attribute to Metaphysics that which of its own right, according to Aristotle belongs to it: that is Critica or Epistomology, wrongly assigned to Logic by modern Scholastics after the struggles with Decartes and Kant.[9]

At the same time, however, he also takes exception to the location of some of Gredt's theses, thereby reflecting the subtility of the issues involved here:

> One can also note a few purely Metaphysical theses inculcated into Natural Philosophy, for example: the references to the separated soul (vol. I, 338-401). St. Thomas expressly teaches that treating of the separated soul belongs to Philosophia Prima (Metaphysics). (In II. Physic. lect. 4., n. 10.) The author also refers to the real distinction between the soul and its faculties, even though this distinction has for its basis and ratio the real distinction between essence and existence, which is a completely Metaphysical thesis, as Cajetan so well noted in his commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle.[10]

Clearly Ramirez would disagree vehemently with Hugon's division which not only mixes natural philosophy and metaphysics in much greater

proportions than does Gredt, but even includes theological considerations readily discovered upon an examination of the text.

Ramirez offers a concise statement of where the boundaries and bridgeheads are between natural philosophy and metaphysics, and it will lead conveniently into the question of abstraction and the division of philosophy:

> It is clear that Natural Philosophy has its points of contact with Metaphysics, principally in two cases: in General Physics or Cosmology, when the first cause or prime mover of physical motion is lood for; and in human Psychology (and, if you will, also in Ethics), where the origin (efficient cause) and end (final cause) of the human soul are investigated. In both cases it is necessary to break away from the physical order and to be put into contact with God, who is the Prince of the metaphysical world. But this contact can only be made provided that it (Natural Philosophy) does not enter into the metaphysical realm, but rather, that it contents itself with opening the door or finding the passport to ascending philosophical understanding.[11]

The Degrees of Abstraction. -- This ascent of understanding is a useful concept for approaching the relationship between the division of philosophy and the degree of abstraction. This is true because, as will be seen, the parts of philosophy are discriminated one from another not so much by the material objects they consider, but by the correspondence of a mode of being with a mode of knowing. At the same time, there must be a recognition that while some objects may be knowable to several parts of philosophy, others may be within the scope of only one.

The issue here is whether behavior is a legitimate object of metaphysics or of natural science, whether psychology belongs to the one discipline or the other. The answer is found in terms of the degrees of abstraction or, as Maritain calls them, the degrees of abstractive visualization.[12]

In this discussion, the term degrees suggests some sort of movement along a continuum or a succession of magnifications or diminutions such as one might achieve with the manipulation of lenses. This is not the case, and the term is regretable. The degrees of abstraction differ among themselves in kind.[13] They are different among themselves because they involve different mental acts. Indeed, abstraction only applies properly to the first two, whereas the third degree is called separation, not abstraction by St. Thomas.[14] Kane explains this difference:

> When we distinguish by judging that one thing is not another or in another, this knowledge is properly called separation, not abstraction. But when we apprehend an essence or essential nature, and understand one thing without understanding another, then our knowledge is rightly called abstraction if the things which are understood one apart from the other are really together in the primary being.[15]

Later he sums this up concisely by saying, "Division by judgement is called separation. . . . Division by apprehension is called abstraction."[16] This notion of division by apprehension reflects the dictum of John of St. Thomas that ". . . the abstraction which defines an order [of knowability] is an initial one and consists of disregarding some sort of material data."[16]

Thus, leaving out individual matter rests the attention on the things whose nature requires matter to be or to be known. Knowledge of this type, having retreated from individual matter, is in the first degree of abstraction and pertains to what is material and changeable. Knowledge of this type is verified by reference to the external senses. This type of verification differentiates it from second degree abstractive knowledge which is verified in the imagination, because it concerns what can be known without material existence being connoted, namely, extension or quantity.[17]

The first degree of abstraction permits an uncluttered view of physical nature, and whatever is disclosed by it belongs to natural philosophy or natural science. It's object is real being; by contrast, the object realized by the second degree of abstraction is reasonal being, ens rationis, because quantity abstracted from its natural subject and studied without immediate reference to it, is a nature deprived of all being except what the mind confers on it.[18] This degree of abstraction isolates the object of mathematics.

In both degrees, what is studied need not be a natural whole; this is obvious in the second degree of abstraction. In the first, the nature under consideration may be either a whole subject such as animality or only a partial one, such as agility. Both are formalities, however, that are meaningless if material existence is completely ignored.

What is called the third degree of abstraction likewise yields up an object which is real being,[19] and the knowledge of this object is resolved in what is intelligible.[20] By contrast to the first and second degrees of abstraction, which leave out something, either individual matter or matter generally, the so-called third degree starts from a different premise and takes in everything.[21] It is abstraction only in the nominal sense of dispensing with the attribution of all data to material sources.

Actually, as seen above, it is separation, not abstraction, which characterizes the third degree, metaphysical knowledge. It all begins with a judgement that immaterial beings exist really separated from material beings. This enunciates a real distinction which not only means that the mind can know about immaterial objects in spite of their lack of revealing material traits, but moreover, that material being is not all being.

Put in another way, it means aspects which immaterial beings have in common with material beings are typical of the latter not by reason of their materiality but by reason of their sheer being.[22] Thus, based on the real distinction of material beings and immaterial beings, a virtual distinction in physical things of materiality from immaterial modes of being opens the way to an examination of all things in terms of being.

The access of this degree of abstraction or separation to all things is pertinent here, because it opens the door of human behavior to some form of metaphysical examination and accordingly furnishes a basis for the difficulty of locating psychology in philosophy. Before exploring that difficulty, however, several points deserve clarification.

The subject of metaphysics. -- The existence of the subject of metaphysics, common being, is discovered at the end of physics, where the existence of the unmoved mover and the immaterial soul are established, as seen in Ramirez, above. Kane, however, notes that concluding to the unmoved mover is not demonstration in the strict sense. It is not knowledge of a reasoned fact, but simply knowledge of a fact attained by reasoning from an effect, motion in the mobile.[23] He marks the frontier between physics and metaphysics, between first and third degree of knowledge, in these terms:

> Likewise, we consider man in natural science and determine that the human form is an intellective soul, and that the act of human intellection is subjectively independent of physical matter, we see that this form is separable from matter, and can be apart from sensory matter and motion. But to consider what the form is which is separated from matter, or what the unmoved-mover is, does not pertain to physical science.[24]

These demand treatment in terms, therefore, of being, and this is why the subject of metaphysics is common being or being as being.[25] It treats everything as related to being and under the aspect of being.[26] But in order to attain a subject of metaphysics, there must be a previous knowledge of material and immaterial being, i.e., that they exist. Physics establishes this fact. It remains to see who material things come within the scope of the third degree of abstraction and metaphysics.

Kane quite directly states the possibility of a material object coming within the ken of several disciplines:

> If we grant the existence of being both material and immaterial, then there is a valid foundation for the objective precision by which a sensory being is conceived either as naturally mobile or as man pertains to physical science. Considered merely as an extended unit, man pertains to mathematics. Considered simply as being, he pertains to metaphysics. In this way, the same thing can pertain to more than once science: it is the same thing really, although it is not considered in the same way, but in ways which are irreducibly different, because they exemplify basic principles which are diverse and which determine different speculative sciences.[27]

In a concurring passage, Kane enumerates some of the aspects under which even material being is considered in metaphysics:

> There are things which do not depend upon sensory matter in order to be, but can be without matter, whether they are simply immaterial, for instance, a spiritual substance or a separated human soul, or may be either material or immaterial, as substance, cause, being, potency, act, one or many. These are objects of metaphysics.[28]

This applies to the subject of human behavior insofar as it is assayable by metaphysical principles. In a passage quoted earlier, Ramirez cited the doctrine of the separated soul and the real distinction of the soul and its faculties as belonging to metaphysics. Likewise, the defense of the

validity of knowledge is metaphysical because it rests on the modes of subjective and intentional being. Generally, what must be resolved in potency and act or in essence and existence must be assigned to metaphysics.

But if a phenomenon is reducible to hylomorphism, matter and form, it belongs to natural science. Within this context, for instance, natural science can conclude to the existence of faculties as causes, and this is sufficient to its purpose, which is to assign a proper cause to sensible behavior, and in this it goes beyond the bare phenomenology of behavior. But knowing the causes of the immaterial faculties calls for a metaphysical inquiry.

Terruwe clearly goes beyond the mere phenomenon in the very fact that she subscribes to a faculty psychology. It is noteworthy at this point when the division of philosophy and the sciences begin to merge with the research writing of a clinical profession, to recall an observation made by Kane:

> St. Thomas speaks for the beginner in terms which the beginner can understand. He speaks of the physicist and the mathematician, and of the things which they investigate. He says that the physicist considers the whole, whereas the mathematician is not interested in the natural whole, but in certain forms or parts . . .
>
> The Thomistic commentators, for their part, often speak of the sciences rather than of the scientists. They speak of physics or metaphysics, and of mathematics whether pure or mixed, and they ask how the various sciences are distinguished. Their point of view is that of doctrine rather than that of discipline.[29]

Terruwe has spoken of rational psychology being in the third degree of abstraction, and that placement is clearly erroneous in view of the foregoing, provided that the metaphysical theses are taken out of it, as it were. Nevertheless, the profession of psychology, as distinct from the science of psychology or rational psychology may borrow what is useful

to it from metaphysics, and this seems to be the sense of Kane's comment on St. Thomas' interest in the scientist.

For his part, Simon speaks most resolutely about the placing of psychology:

> Considering the philosophy of the world (cosmology) and the philosophy of the soul (psychology) as parts of metaphysics is, from a Thomistic point of view, completely nonsensical; for the whole observable world, including the human soul which is the form of a perishable body, belongs to the order of objects which can neither exist nor be thought of apart from matter.[30]

Positive Science and Philosophy. -- This still leaves the question of what connection can be made between the phenomenology of the positive science of psychology and the philosophical study of psychology, and this is where Maritain clashes with Fernandez-Alanso and Kane.

The latter two hold for a unitary natural science or natural philosophy which denies the division between the positive natural science and natural philosophy on the premise that they share the same formal object of changeable being as such. Therefore, they are one science.

Maritain defends the opposite position, namely that while positive natural science and natural philosophy, of which rational psychology is a part, share the same degree of abstraction, they differ in emphasis, with natural philosophy emphasizing the being of mobile being and natural science emphasizing the mobility of mobile being.[31] Simon offers a basis for this the idea that as being the physical object is intelligible and as mobile or changeable it is observable.

This distinction is a result of an attempt to proceed from the initial abstraction of first, second, and third degree to a terminal abstraction or distinction within the first degree. Neither St. Thomas

nor John of St. Thomas makes such a terminal distinction there, but John of St. Thomas teaches a terminal distinction in the second degree of abstraction, with arithmetic and geometry being differentiated, and in the third degree, with logic, metaphysics, and theology being differentiated. Making a similar differentiation within the first degree allows for a distinction of natural philosophy and positive science, and this is what Maritain does.[32]

Maritain's position is something of a middle ground between Wolffian metaphysics and sheer empiricism. Simon insists that the natural philosopher is not a metaphysician, for his definitions have some reference to sensory data. On the other hand, the natural scientist is an empiriologist, not an empiricist, because he credits the consistency of what he observes with some ratio entis or principle of intelligibility.[33]

In exploring Maritain's view of natural science, Simon characterizes the natural world as bipolar, with intelligible objects expressing themselves through a stream of sense appearances and conversely as consisting of a stream of sense appearances stabilized by a center of stability. This polarity is met by the above-mentioned emphasis either upon intelligibility, which is a physical-ontological approach, or on observability, which is physical and non-ontological.[34] Physical thinking organizes around one or the other pole, depending on how it frames its definitions. While the philosophical involves a conceptual consideration whose conceptual instruments call for an ascending analysis, one ascending to a concept of being, positive science, by contrast, calls for an analysis descending to sensory data,[35] and the object of the science is the phenomenal regularities themselves.[36]

Franz subscribes to Maritain's views on this and articulates them in these terms:

> The philosophical species represent the essence of things in themselves whereas the empirical scientific species represent these essences through external signs. This flows from the fact that sensible being attained by natural philosophy participates in metaphysical being more than does the mobile being studied by empirical sciences.[37]

The ascending analysis penetrates to the essence of a thing and occurs by what Maritain calls dianoetical intellection. However, it is not possible to know the essence of most things, and the descending analysis which circumscribes the essence must be appealed to. This occurs in perinoetical intellection.[38]

This knowability of nature is really the crux of the difference between authors such as Maritain and those in Kane's school. Maritain does not think that physical natures are generally knowable, and Kane thinks that they are. The concept of perinoetical knowledge is Maritain's answer to Simon's question, ". . . whether there is room in the first order of abstraction for more than one approach to the physical world."[39] Kane's answer is explicit:

> The sensory appearances of things sufficiently manifest the natures, and in relation to the natures of things natural phenomena are intelligible. Of course, we cannot grasp the natures of things as clearly and distinctly as we know mathematical essences, which are understood apart from sensory matter. Yet we do not say that the natures of things are hidden from us, but rather that they are manifested to us through their sensory properties and effects. The shape of the teeth, for example, is causally and ontologically related to the nature and behavior of the animal, and is intelligible in relation to the nature and the behavior. In like manner all the typical structures and functions of natural things have natural principles and causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, material, formal, efficient, or final, all of which should be investigated by the naturalist. Hence natural science can and should extend to the ultimate species with all their typical properties and relations. In fact,

it is this knowledge which constitutes the perfection of natural science, just as the rich variety of specific detail constitutes the perfection of the natural world.[40]

In a subsequent development, he delivers his characterization of what the empiriology of Maritain is:

It seems clear that there cannot be a speculative and non-mathematical science of natural phenomena, in the Aristotelian sense of science, distinct from natural philosophy. . . . Those who claim that non-mathematical science of natural phenomena is distinct from natural philosophy do not say that it is a science in the Aristotelian sense. The fact that it is not a science in the Aristotelian sense is not its glory but its weakness, because it is thereby restricted to merely dialectical constructions. Furthermore, to distinguish the science of phenomena -- whatever this may be -- from the philosophy of nature is to reduce this science to a mere fraction of its stature as conceived by Aristotle and St. Thomas, and as permitted by its own principles and proper methods. Through the sensory appearance of things, and only in this way, the specific natures of things can be known and defined. Without a detailed investigation of natural things such as is undertaken in modern science only a few general truths about their principles and properties can be known, whereas with the aid of modern experimental techniques a great deal can be known and understood in a genuinely scientific way through the proper principles and causes of physical science. It is merely arbitrary to abbreviate natural philosophy and to restrict it to a few general truths. It is unnecessary and unnatural to leave a gap between natural philosophy and natural science and by that very gap prevent the latter from being science in the strict sense of the term.[41]

Almost as if taking a saving stand in rebuttal of Maritain's case Simon appeals to the mentality of the scientist and the philosopher to resolve the tension between the two disciplines:

Maritain is quite aware of the great improvements in knowledge which can be expected from the cooperation of the philosopher and the scientist; but he does not seem to believe that such a cooperation can ever work smoothly and without frictions. The vast ensemble of our knowledges of nature -- philosophical, empiriological, empiriometrical -- is apparently destined to present everlastingly a spectacle of restlessness, of precarious equilibrium, with sharp conflicts breaking out in times of crisis. Such a lack of harmony would be sufficiently accounted for by the psychology of the scientist and that of the philosopher. It is

> difficult, not to say impossible, for each of them not to be biased by his own habitus to the point of being unable to understand his partner. But even if a perfect philosopher were also a perfect physicist, or vice versa, there still would be within the mind provided with such habitus ground for conflicts between the two visions of the world.[42]

This begs the question.

Conclusion. -- Overall, this writer finds difficulties with the views of Maritain, because they seem to resort to a dualism in the constitution of physical things, verging very close to the idea of two beings, physical and metaphysical, phenomenal and ontological, instead of two-fold being. There is a scent of onion-layer ontology here, and the unity of the physical subject seems to be as much undermind as the unity of knowledge. Thus, Maritain appears to separate things which are merely distinct, and that process suggests an underlying proclivity toward metaphysics at the expense of physics. The dualism is epitomized by the appeal to the syntactical combination of ens and mobile; that collapses if mobile is invoked as a substantive, and it hints at having succumbed to one's pet pedagogical device, a formulation which, as often as not, is more neat than true.

Dr. Terruwe has expressed an affinity for the view of philosophy and science like Maritain's. Nevertheless, what she actually writes comes closer to the one-discipline view of Fernandez-Alanso and Kane. As will subsequently be seen, she is not a phenomenalist nor even an emperiologist in Maritain's sense of the word.

This is partly due to the fact that, as she says, she accepted the tenets of rational psychology as at least an hypothessis and successfully

tried them against the empirical findings of her profession. Thus in no sense did she make an induction from empirical data to philosophical principles. On the other hand, once she confirmed the correspondance of principles and data, she exploited it to the discovery of new types of neurosis. In this, she proceeds somewhat in the manner of the physicist who scans mathematical formulae for an expression of a phenomenon which he had discovered. The difference, however, lies in the fact that she reconciled psychological facts with psychological principles.

Dr. Terruwe's Concept of Repression and Neurosis

Introduction

This thesis is not concerned with repression and neurosis as such, but with Dr. Terruwe's application of rational psychology to their identification and treatment. What she has to say about rational psychology and behavior as seen by modern psychiatry is orientated toward these disorders, however, and it will be helpful at this point to summarize her concept of repression and neurosis in terms of rational psychology.

The nature of repression and neurosis

First of all, repression and neurosis are distinguished from one another as cause and effect; repression is an action or a conflict, while neurosis is a condition or a status proceeding from repression. Dr. Terruwe characterizes it thus:

> Fundamentally, the neurosis is the result of two factors: a desire which arises in the mind and a force which opposes and represses this desire. However, the desire does not disappear completely as a result of this repression; it continues to exert its influence in the unconscious life and manifests itself in symptoms which may be called pathological.[43]

It should be noted that when Dr. Terruwe uses the word mental, she does not mean by it, intellectual. Rather, it is best taken in the widest possible sense of cognitive, or even, perhaps, as simply the opposite of somatic.

The foregoing capsulizes her doctrine. To enlarge somewhat, repression always involves a conflict of feelings in which the influence of reason is interdicted.[44] Dr. Terruwe is emphatic in repeatedly stating that repression never proceeds from reasonable motivation, because it is entirely normal for the feelings to be subordinated and subject to reason. Indeed, when reason dominates in accord with its natural primacy, the result is the formation of a habit in the subordinated faculty.[45] In this process neurosis is flatly impossible.[46]

By contrast, the conflict which results in neurosis involves one appetite, or as Dr. Terruwe sometimes calls it, feeling, dominating another. There are certain natural interrelationships which make the conflict and the eventual repressive triumph of an appetite possible.

The faculties generating neurosis

In line with the findings of rational psychology, Dr. Terruwe recognizes three appetites or behavior inclinations in man: one is on the highest level, the intellectual appetite or the will, which is capable of deliberated action; the other two, namely, the pleasure appetite and the utility appetite, are on the bodily, sensory level. They are better known in scholastic terminology as the concupiscible and the irascible passions.

The pleasure appetite elicits feelings of love, desire, and happiness, as well as their opposites, hate, aversion, and sorrow; they

constitute man's reactions to things which are pleasing or distasteful immediately on contact. On the other hand, feelings of daring, fear, hope, and despair are seated in the utility appetite and express man's ability to incline to a deferred gain of greater value to him, sacrificing an immediate pleasure-pain response.[47]

A judgement of sorts must enter in here to lend effect to the recognition of competing values and to assign priorities. The cogitative power or particular reason, as it is also called, meets this need.[48] It is a sensory power which apprehends impressions such as danger, usefulness, friendship, and hostility, participates in communicating sensory values to the reason, and echoes reasoned values in the registering of sense data.

The cogitative has a particular influence on the utility appetite because of the perceptions it has. In the genesis of repression it can interpret a movement of the pleasure appetite without reference to reason in such a way as to excite the utility to respond as if addressing a threat instead of serving the concupiscible feelings, as it is meant to do. Sometimes the pleasure appetite represses an irascible emotion, but most often the opposite happens.[49]

The utility appetite may gag the emotion itself or it may simply fail to mobilize its resources in the interests of the pleasure appetite; either way, it interposes itself between the repressed emotion and reason, eliminating the effective influence of reason in the particular instance, so that the repression becomes chronic.[50] With this state of affairs, the striving of the repressed emotions endures without finding its wonted effect or expression, and the energy and tension associated with the emotion eventually surface in behavior taken as symptomatic of the disorder.

The essential point in Dr. Terruwe's analysis of neurosis is that the very subordination of faculties which makes reasoned behavior possible is suborned into the establishment of a pathological state by the faulty influence of the cogitative.

The Scope, Order, and Sources of This Thesis

The study which follows aims at verifying to what extent Dr. Terruwe actually has adopted Thomistic psychology to the elucidation of psychiatric findings. Rather than simply offering a counterpuntal recital of parallel passages, this study will approach its objective by two steps. The first is confirmatory, consisting in the investigation and identification of which Thomistic principles are most influential in Dr. Terruwe's writings, a location of their origins in St. Thomas, and an analysis of their context and application in the works of the two authors. The second step is differential and consists in identifying and analyzing differences in the doctrine of the two authors and specifying the nature of the differences.

Dr. Terruwe professedly adopts the substance of Thomistic psychology so that a simple review of corresponding teachings is not particularly informative, nor are disputes to be expected. Indeed it will be seen that the differences are of the nature of psychiatric findings highlighting facets of St. Thomas' teaching and lending new interest to them.

Some parts of St. Thomas' teaching are rather obscure simply because they are shelved here and there throughout his various works, sometimes more informatively expressed as an aside, a response to an objection, or an example than they are in tracts professedly concerned with psychology. The utility aspect of the irascible appetite and the doctrine of the cogitative are two instances of this obscurity.

Thus, in addition to citing the great tracts on the passions and the faculties in the first two parts of the Summa Theologiae, this thesis relies heavily on other theological and philosophical works of St. Thomas: the commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate and de Anima, the Contra Gentes, and the commentary on Aristotle's de Anima. The latter, incidentally, furnishes less to the topic under consideration than might be expected.

With the assistance of the foregoing orientation, it is now possible to begin the investigation of the important Thomistic principles in Dr. Terruwe's work.

CHAPTER II

THE THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES IMPORTANT IN DR. TERRUWE'S WORK

The Subordination of Psychological Faculties

Introduction

The underlying principle of Dr. Terruwe's evaluation of psychiatric findings in the light of rational psychology is that the psychological faculties are subordinated one to another; this principle is important because it is this subordination which structurally expresses the various natural relationships, forms of causality, and sources of movement which beget either normal behavior or neurotic behavior, depending on whether or not the operational sequence proceeds according to the subordination or escapes it.

The acceptance of faculty psychology

The rejection and postulation of faculties. -- However, the concept of subordination presupposes the acceptance of a faculty psychology, i.e., the acceptance that faculties exist as the basis of behavior. This acceptance is contrary to the position of the empirical psychologists, one of the chief of whom is Johann Friedrich Herbart, whose doctrine has been summarized by Dr. Cecil Alec Mace in these terms:

> His central thesis was that the facts of experience with which psychology is concerned are to be explained, not by reference to "faculties," but by reference to the laws governing the combination and interaction of those ultimate mental states variously described as sensations, images, ideas, or presentations.[1]

Dr. Baars, Dr. Terruwe's translator, notes in comment on Dr. Terruwe's position, that empirical psychologists who deny the existence of immaterial faculties overstep their own boundaries, and he says that others who accept faculties as empirically determined facts likewise err.[2] His description of how faculties are postulated is helpful:

> It is true that the existence of these faculties cannot be demonstrated empirically. One observes the act and the function, and the organ, too, can be observed; but the postulation of the existence of a faculty always requires an inference, however simple and obvious it may be. One makes the observation that a certain function occurs which is peculiar to a particular being, and one infers from this that the being must possess a certain disposition from which that function originates. This disposition is the faculty which, in a further logical step, is ascribed to certain organs. But again, this is not an observation of empirical psychology; it is an inference from rational psychology,[3] which, however, does not prevent it from being a valid conclusion.

At the beginning of her study Dr. Terruwe sketches out the essential line of the existence and relationship of the faculties. The inference from objects and acts to the nature of the faculties is clearly stated:

> Man possesses still another life which is a higher order than sensory life: the intellectual life. The object of sense cognition and sense appetite is limited to concrete, sensory things, but in addition to this, man also knows non-sensory things and possesses universal ideas which abstract from the concrete and individual limitations of singular objects. What is universal can never be known or desired by the sense faculties as such. There is a necessary and essential relationship between the faculty and its object because a faculty or power is directed to a specific object and necessarily belongs to the same order. If the object is a concrete and material one, then the faculty directed to it will also have to be a concrete and material one. But if an object is immaterial, it can never be grasped by a sensory and material faculty. Consequently, faced with the fact that man knows immaterial things and possesses universal ideas, it is necessary to postulate the presence of an immaterial faculty through which he is able to know and acquire those immaterial things. The same is true of the faculty of appetition. Man desires what he knows. If he knows immaterial things, his appetite will also direct itself to those things. Therefore,

> because of the necessary and essential relation between a faculty and its object, man must possess an immaterial faculty of appetition.[4]

The foregoing is significant in Dr. Terruwe's work, not only because it affirms the inference of faculties,[5] but because it enunciates two of the essential principles in her work and in St. Thomas', namely, the proportionality of faculties to objects, and the presupposition of knowledge to appetite. Here they serve to distinguish sensory faculties from intellectual ones, and cognitive ones from appetitive ones. Later there will be occasion in this study to consider in greater detail the importance of these two principles in Dr. Terruwe's work.

St. Thomas' inference of distinct faculties. -- Dr. Terruwe's presentation of the inference of the faculties follows St. Thomas' principal line of reasoning. It is noteworthy, however, that St. Thomas does not consider the question of whether the faculties exist; their existence is taken for granted, and he makes his beginning by inquiring rather as to how many potencies there are and how they are distinguished from one another and from the soul.

In the Disputed Questions on the Soul, Article XIII is framed in terms of the question, "Whether the powers of the Soul are distinguished from one another by their objects."[6] In his commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, he follows the philosopher's procedure, commenting, "In the first place he makes a determination about the powers of the soul in general by distinguishing them from one another." ("In prima determinat de potentiis animae in communi, distinguendo eas ab invicem.")[7] In the Summa Theologiae, he similarly proceeds from investigating the distinction

of the power and the essence of the soul to the distinction of the powers among themselves, and so forth.[8]

Nevertheless, St. Thomas does furnish the principles, quoted above from Terruwe, which justify the inference of the powers' existence. But he approaches the question differently in different works.

First of all, St. Thomas observes in commenting on Aristotle's de Anima that the various life operations distinguish the powers of the soul from one another rather than the levels of life from one another.[9] He explains that when Aristotle speaks of parts of the soul he means powers of the soul[10] and then recites Aristotle's line of reasoning that operations which pertain to the immaterial being of living things are attributable to the vegetative power, and that what pertains to the intervening middle being to the sensitive power of the soul.[11]

This inference of operation-to-faculty he immediately complements by utilizing the principle of knowledge-appetition to distinguish the existence of the appetitive and the locomotive powers.[12]

It should be emphasized that here as in his other statements on the distinction of the powers, he considers them to be genera of powers or faculties, which is to say that there are more than five faculties specifically. The implications of this may be seen not only in the distinction of the intellective appetite from the sense appetite, but in Terruwe's comment that differing formalities of objects lead to the conjecture that the locomotive power consists in more than one faculty.[13]

Thus, in the commentary on the de Anima, St. Thomas has followed a somewhat different line of distinction, since he works from levels of being to three of the faculties, and by the form-appetite principle from

there. In his own treatments, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, for instance, and the Summa, he distinguishes them by formal objects.[14] The treatment in the Summa does acknowledge the method borrowed from Aristotle and then enuntiates the one which consists of reasoning from formal objects. The survey in the Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima is very economical, and Terruwe's corresponds with it. In all of these, it is fair to say that if the powers can be distinguished by means of the principles named above, a fortiori their existence can be inferred.

Answering those who rejected the existence of the faculties fell to later authors, and modern manuals of Thomistic philosophy defend the thesis. Gredt offers an example of this,[15] and it is affirmed in the sixteenth Thomistic Thesis of Leo XII, "The faculties whether organic or inorganic emanate from the human soul as a natural result."[16]

The subordination of faculties

The inferential discovery of subordination and subjection. -- As has been seen above, Dr. Terruwe defines neurosis in terms of a breakdown in the natural operational order of the psychic powers, and this outcome of her acceptance of the existence and subordination of psychological faculties reflects the importance of her adoption of Thomistic psychology.

The emphasis in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine is on operational subordination, and for this reason she especially applies the principle of the faculties being proportioned to objects. This implements a procedure of inferring to a faculty of knowledge or appetition from observed actions regarding known objects. But inference also necessarily includes the postulation of certain internal objects and functions not immediately

known to consciousness. Moreover, the process of inference which concludes to the existence of faculties also bespeaks ontological subordination as well as operative subordination, because operation follows being. Indeed, this type of subordination is seen in Aristotle's doctrine which St. Thomas comments on in II In de Anima, 5.

Thus in reviewing Dr. Terruwe's doctrine it is pertinent to recognize that St. Thomas' doctrine is more inclusive, inasmuch as he treats of both types of subordination, operational and entitative. The application of this difference lies in the fact that one may profitably distinguish entitative subordination from operative subjection, the point being that effective subjection of powers may be in discrepancy from entitative subordination, and this discrepancy forms a psychological disorder. Furthermore, operative subjection, as recognized by both authors, may be primarily ancillary and preparatory to higher functions, or it may be primarily obediential and executive, as will be seen.

Terruwe's method of distinguishing faculties. — Dr. Terruwe's doctrine of the subordination of faculties is mostly contained in Chapter 1, Normal Psychology. She begins by reviewing the Aristotelian doctrine on the three grades of life[17] and distinguishes five genera of faculties in a passage quoted above. Thereafter, she proceeds with a description of how the various faculties are distinguished on the basis of their objects. In this she follows the order of the Questiones Disputatae de Anima, passing through the sensory cognitive and appetitive faculties and then the intellectual cognitive and appetitive faculties, rather than using the order of the Summa; it traces the sensitive and intellective cognitive train before teaching about the corresponding appetitive faculties.

In her treatment of the external senses, she avoids any detailed treatment of the distinguishing features of the five senses, and this is in contrast to St. Thomas' explanations in the Questiones Disputatae de Anima and the Summa.[18] Such a development would evidently contribute little to the theory of neurosis, and it implicitly finds justification in St. Thomas' tract on the senses. There he comments that there are no particular differences between the external sense impressions of men and animals, but that a difference does exist in the functions of the internal senses, since these senses are prompted by instinct in animals but depend upon the ability to compare and infer in man.[19] Dr. Terruwe gives special attention to both of these abilities here[20] and throughout the book and notes a functional difference in the imagination, in the fact that reason and will can mobilize it.[21]

In undertaking her summary of normal psychology, Dr. Terruwe comments that the study of the cognitive life is not so important to her purpose as is the appetitive life,[22] and this emphasis is reflected in the fact that she does not single out the agent intellect for mention in her review of the intellect's adaption of sensory knowledge,[23] although the agent intellect is something of a celebrity in the history of scholastic psychology.

The Thomistic basis of entitative and operative ranking. -- It is a natural step now from the distinction to the subordination of powers. St. Thomas furnishes a means of stating the subordination of the powers which helps to put Dr. Terruwe's doctrine in the context of entitatively and operatively subordinated ranks. He points out[24] that there is a threefold order in the powers; two of these proceed from the dependence of one

power on another either according to the order of nature, in which the more perfect is prior to the less perfect, or else according to the order of generation and time, insofar as one power initiates action toward a more perfect power. The subordination of the sensory powers to the intellective is an example of the first, the dependence of the intellective powers on the sensitive powers, which exercise a preparatory function, is an example of the second.

Thirdly, one power may be prior to another because it addresses an object which is prior to the objects of the other senses. This classification tends to parallel the first classification in that the dignity of an action implied by its reference to an object is an operative dignity, and the first classification involves an entitative dignity. A parallel exists to the extent that like apprehends like and faculties encompass objects with powers and attributes corresponding with those of the subject of the power.

The cognitive dependencies of the internal and external senses. -- Dr. Terruwe's scheme of subordination may be summarized as follows. Entitatively, the external senses are the most deeply subordinated of the cognitive and appetitive faculties, but operationally they enjoy the priority of being the faculties upon which the entire sequence depends, since knowledge and appetition begins with sense perceptions of the concrete individual singular.[25]

The internal senses of imagination, the common sense, memory, and the estimative power depend on the external sense operationally, but not in the same way. While the common sense and the imagination are concerned with the object of knowledge as it is in itself, the estimative and the

memory are objectified by the object as it is in the senses. The difference lies in the fact that these two faculties function in a way that presupposes that the object is known, not as a scattering of sensations experienced by the several senses, but as a psychic unit, reassembled as it were by the common sense and reproduced, if necessary, by the imagination.[26]

These four internal senses are all obediential subject to the intellect, however, inasmuch as the intellect can influence and command their actions, but they have a converse operational priority over the intellect in that they prepare sense data for the light of the intellect.[27] This dependency of the intellect is largely in the cognitive order, whereas their dependence on it can ultimately be used to cognitive ends or appetitive ends. For instance, the intellect can elicit phantasms for the sake of knowledge or in the formulation of motives, and it can influence the estimative in its judgements concerning sensory ends. Thus, St. Thomas mentions its ability to excite or settle anger.[28]

The dependencies of the internal senses and sense appetites. -- The internal senses are cognitive faculties, and, as indicated above, they relate to the intellective powers as ancillary powers. Besides this relation, however, they also relate to the sense appetites, furnishing them with objects, but again, not in the same way. The objects known simply as attractive or repugnant appeal to the pleasure appetite and are disclosed to it through the action of the common sense and the imagination, because they know the object in itself, simply as agreeable or disagreeable to the senses.

But an object which excites appetites regardless of the immediate sensory response it excites, is acting in virtue of a relation known to

the estimative and the memory; these powers register impressions that relate to the nature of the subject, and they prompt appetitive reactions to things which are not ends in themselves, but means to the ends of the pleasure appetite.[29] Because of the higher perceptions, influenced by the intellect, these powers lend a dignity to the irrascible appetite, which is the one fixing upon means, and this is the kind of priority suggested by St. Thomas above as the third type. But since the irascible or utility appetite serves the ends of the pleasure appetite, it is subordinated to it operationally.[30] This subordination is extremely important in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine and departs from the usual emphasis on the entitative priority of the irascible.

In the genus of locomotive power Dr. Terruwe distinguishes the reflexes, which proceed in immediate dependence on sense apprehension without the intervention of appetite, the psychomotor reactions, which are the transmutatio corporalis which characterizes the passions, and thirdly, the voluntary motor reactions, which are moves toward ends imperated by the will and subordinated to it. This genus is quite encompassing since, in Dr. Terruwe's terms it is "the sum total of all movements which result from a sensory stimulus."[31]

The dependencies relating to the intellective powers. -- In the cognitive line, the intellect has an operational dependence on the internal and external senses, but it enjoys a superiority which is both entitative, because of its immaterial being, and operative, because of its immaterial object whose emergence equips the intellect to influence the lower powers.[32] In harmony with the principle of the appetite following upon knowledge, the will enjoys priority over the other appetitive powers because its object is

the universal good under which other goods are subsumed. It, of course, enjoys the intellect's immaterial mode of existence.

Because their objects encompass the objects of the sense appetites, these appetites have not merely an entitative subordination but an operative one as well, in terms of which, Dr. Terruwe voices St. Thomas' dictum, "Appetitus sensitivus natus est obedire rationi (it is the nature of the sense appetite to obey reason)."[33] This, really, is the pivotal principle in her work, presupposing as it does the general subordination of powers and finding expression, as has been seen, in the role of the estimative and the utility appetite in the genesis of neurosis.

St. Thomas on specification and imperation. -- St. Thomas offers an analysis of the obediential subordination of the sense appetites to the intellective powers of the reason and the will which clarifies the operational process. This is a matter of distinguishing the specification and imperation of acts. After commenting that it is reason rather than the simple understanding which the sense appetites obey,[34] he shows that in contrast to the instinctive response of an animal's estimative power and sense appetite to sensory objects, a man's senses depend on the influence of the cogitative power or particular reason, which, in drawing particular judgements or conclusions, is influenced by the universal knowledge of the intellectual reason. Thus, the sense appetites obey the reason according to the form or specification of their own actions.

By contrast, their obedience to the imperation of the will concerns the execution of their acts, inasmuch as they are secondary movers subordinated to a primary mover or appetite upon whose consent they depend. It is noteworthy that St. Thomas affirms in the article cited above that

through this subordinated function, the cogitative influences both the pleasure and the utility appetite.

The distinction of entitative and operative dependence opens up a thicket of relationships whose individual implications, such as the influence of the cogitative over the pleasure appetite, just mentioned, can only be alluded to briefly here, although they will figure in subsequent discussion. Nevertheless, the psychological doctrine of both authors rests on the connections sketched out here. Indeed, far from being a scholar's entanglement, they are rather the lines and axes by which the architecture of normalcy is constituted, and this can now be seen.

The normalcy of subordinated faculties

Reason's sway in operative subjection. -- The formal causality exercised here by the reason in the subordination of powers is a principal point of convergence between the values of psychological normality, psychological abnormality, and ethical imputability, and this is recognized both by Dr. Terruwe and by St. Thomas. Dr. Terruwe states:

> Hence, in the natural order moral acts correspond to reasonable acts, for if man is to attain the good that is proper to him, he must conduct himself as man, that is, as a rational being. By acting according to reason, his actions are morally right, because the rules of morality are merely formulations of what is intrinsically rational.[35]

In a corresponding passage, St. Thomas affirms this humanistic ethical basis, and he is careful to allude to the fact that subordination to reason does not deprive the lower powers of their own character:

> And this is the natural order, that the higher appetite should move the lower . . .; the lower appetite, although it retains

> something of its proper motion, is nevertheless moved in the natural order by the movement of the higher appetite and by the movement of the reason deliberating. However, if it happens conversely, namely that the higher appetite is controlled by the lower, this is outside the natural order. Hence, it makes this a sin, ethically, inasmuch as sins are monsters, as it were, in nature.[36]

Dr. Terruwe, of course, is not speaking as a moralist and indeed she devotes some attention to the professional limits of psychologists, psychiatrists, and moralists[37] in her final chapter on the freedom of the will in neurotics. Hence she does not draw a conclusion as to the ethical implications of abnormal acts. St. Thomas, however, does, since he so often treats these topics in an ethical context or with an eye to the student's ethical interest.

He employs the term insane [amens] in a rather undifferentiated sense, although it is clear that he intends seriously disturbed patients by it, and he contrasts the virtuous to the insane, as in the Summa, I-II, 12, 3 ad 2. There he enumerates three possible psychological conditions and assigns their moral consequences. The first is the total harmony of the intellectual and sensitive natures, insofar as the sensitive power is wholly subjected [subicitur] to the reason, and this he ascribes to the virtuous. The opposite condition, with the reason wholly absorbed by passion, he attributes to the insane. The third is the area of conflict, with passion assailing reason, numbing it somewhat, but still leaving it able to assert its own priorities.

This latter status concurs with one outlined by Dr. Terruwe in commenting on the imperfection of nature. She says that we experience "desires which are not in harmony with our rational understanding of the objective good. Therefore, we must deny ourselves the gratification of those

desires."[38] The imperative must makes the latter an ethical judgement, but it strikes a parallel with St. Thomas' recognition of a middle ground of conflict that is not pathological.

Pathology and the predominance of reason. -- Indeed, for Dr. Terruwe it is precisely the surviving influence of reason which prevents pathology, for in that survival, the subjection of acts corresponding with the entitative subordination of powers is preserved. In this case, the emotional life remains at least imperfectly disposed to act according to reason. She comments:

> If reason denies the demands of the emotional life, the latter, no matter how great its resistance, will sooner or later become tranquil again and abide by the judgement of reason. Or at least, there will be a balance between the two with reason providing the necessary guidance.[39]

The consequence of her acceptance of the subordination of powers is that it enables her to explain why neurosis does not proceed from the subjection of the lower powers to the reason and the will, and indeed, to assert that neurosis absolutely impossible in such circumstances, since the natural order is preserved.[40]

It is significant of the profound importance which Dr. Terruwe attaches to this subordination and the attendant impossibility of neurosis when the subordination is realized, that she asserts, "It is, so to speak, an intrinsic need of man's emotional life to operate under the guidance of reason. Only in this way does it attain its natural perfection."[41] Her statement discloses a clear appreciation of the body-soul unity of man, a fundamental Thomistic concept, and it implies that while there is a material similarity between the sensory faculties of man and animals, in

man they are invested with the transcendental difference of being human faculties, faculties entitatively and operatively related to reason and will, and thereby perfectable in terms of that relationship. She carries this further in a subsequent statement:

> Normally, when a certain emotion arises in man in regard to a sensory object, it requires, by virtue of being a human emotion, direction by reason. The intellect must decide whether the sensory object also constitutes a rational good, and consequently, whether the desire must be allowed or denied. Either decision provides a natural solution which does not disrupt the harmony of his mental life.[42]

There is a sense of this view in St. Thomas, in a comment he makes about the internal senses of man:

> It must be said that the memorative and cogitative powers in man enjoy that eminence, not through what is proper to the sensitive part, but through a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, on the basis of a certain redundancy. Therefore, they are not different powers but the same, yet more perfect than they are in other animals.[43]

The obediential relationship is evidently the principal aspect of the affinity, since he comments, "To a certain extent the operations of the sensitive soul are obedient to reason, and therefore to a certain extent they are rational."[44] ("Operationes animae sensitivae sunt aliqualiter obedientes rationi; et ideo sunt aliqualiter rationales.")

Likewise it seems reasonable to read this transcendent dignity of the human sensory powers into St. Thomas' view that they are rational through participation.[45] Later there will be occasion to consider the similarity of participation as seen by St. Thomas and penetration by reason seen in Dr. Terruwe.

The educational implications of reasoned subordination. -- A further consequence of Dr. Terruwe's acceptance of subordination and of the humanity of the subordinated sense powers may be seen in its educational impact and in the possibility of vicarious subordination in children.

The absence of reason effectively operating in children and even in adolescents is recognized by both authors. For instance, St. Thomas alludes to the fact that children act by an instinctive estimative power rather than by reasonally influenced cogitative.[46]

Dr. Terruwe emphasizes the point that the child is disposed by nature to receive the rational guidance of the parent and educator, since his own reason is not sufficiently developed. Grave mistakes can be made in child guidance, and in view of this she insists that the child must be brought up in a rational manner because he is a rational being. If there is a failure here, the child "remains frustrated in the most fundamental need of his mental life, and of necessity it remains undeveloped psychologically."[47]

Dr. Terruwe is particularly concerned that in this procedure the pleasure appetite be given its proper scope, that objective sensory goods be experienced as good, and that the utility appetite be held in check until such a time as reason can assert a mature type of influence.[48] Her interest in the training and developing of the emotions is very much reminiscent of Aristotle's views on the role of music in the emotional development of children.[49]

Conclusion. -- A considerable amount of space has been devoted to drawing out the associations of Dr. Terruwe's and St. Thomas' doctrines

on the subordination of faculties and to highlighting some of its implications, because it is the foundation upon which everything else rests. It is now possible to dwell on more particularized elements of Dr. Terruwe's doctrine, the first of these being the role of the internal senses as principles which she endorses with St. Thomas.

The Importance of the Internal Senses

Introduction

In the summary of Dr. Terruwe's concept of repression and neurosis given above, the role of the cogitative power gives some idea of the influence of the internal senses in human behavior. Indeed, the coherency and cogency of her doctrine derives especially from her acceptance of these four faculties, namely, the common sense, the imagination, the cogitative power, and the power of the experience or reminiscence, because they are the ground where the external senses and the passions meet the intellect and will, as it were. As seen above, the interaction of higher and lower powers could not take place without them.

The internal senses as mediators

This impossibility is quite apparent from Dr. Terruwe's presentation, and what she has to say is entirely in accord with St. Thomas' doctrine. The line of tracing this impossibility is largely that by which the existence and distinction of these faculties is inferred.

Thus, just as we infer the common sense from the fact that our experience presents whole objects rather than scattered sensations,[50] and the imagination from the fact that objects can be reproduced in our minds, so also the political influence of the reason over the passions cannot be

explained unless the cogitative is there to execute a proportion between the universals of reason and the particulars of the senses.[51] The ability of the intellect to consider the data of sense knowledge, not only as united by the common sense but as capable of being isolated bit by bit and reorganized at will is further testimony of the creative and analytical value of the internal senses.[52]

Even without the interplay of sense and intellect, as is the case with animal life, the internal senses mediate between sense cognition and appetition by resolving either the knowledge of the external senses-common sense-imagination train in the appetitive responses of the pleasure appetite or that of the estimative-memorative combination in the appetitive responses of the utility appetite.[53]

The internal senses as human

The doctrine of both authors accords a twofold distinction to the internal senses in man, one based on their preparatory role in the intellective process and the other on their elevating influence on the senses and the passions. Dr. Terruwe sees the influence of the intellect as the source of difference between human and animal internal senses:

> All of the above-mentioned sensory cognitive faculties are also found in man. Here, however, their functions are strongly influenced by man's higher cognitive faculty, namely, the intellect. Man's intellect not only utilizes the sensory cognitive powers, but it also ennobles them by its greater penetrating power and universality.[54]

This is very much the same as St. Thomas says in the passage quoted above, page 37.[55]

Dr. Terruwe goes on to show how the intellect through its universal viewpoint, as it were, particularly influences the imagination, so

that its sense impressions are less forceful and compelling. The implications of this effect are that the senses do not invincibly trigger an appetitive response as they do in animals. The universal knowledge of the intellect offers options both of specification and of execution. She also cites the intellect's ability to manipulate phantasm in the creative process.

The importance of affinity with the intellect and will

Both of these roles concur with St. Thomas' findings. He points out that the imagination is rather exceptional among the human senses in that it has two different, though related, functions, namely, to conserve what is received from the senses and to present such things to the intellect.[56] It abstracts, of course, from the subjective presence or absence of the object[57] and this is the first step in the abstractive process culminating in the intellect. It and the creative contribution which imagination makes are the result of the fact that imagination can be activated by voluntary control.[58] St. Thomas gives it particular importance as a prerequisite in the process of reasoning and conjecture, and epistomologically he contrasts it with the relationship of sensation to the certitude of simple understanding.[59] This is because he considers deliberation to be a juggling and selection of phantasms.[60] It is, of course, his doctrine and Dr. Terruwe's that the role of the external and internal senses is contributory, and that the actual act of intellection is purely spiritual or immaterial[61] and accomplished without activity of the senses.[62]

In St. Thomas' view the internal senses in man are distinctive not only for their ancillary role to the higher powers, but also because they are influenced by them. He particularly singles out the cogitative and

the power of experience or recall and says that they enjoy a certain excellence because of their affinity to reason, inasmuch as they are meant to obey reason.[63] The same influence of the higher powers removes them from the domain of sheer instinct and equips the internal senses as well as the sense appetites to acquire habits which perfect their operations.[64]

The importance of affinity with the senses

The utility and the unique importance of the internal senses in constituting a meeting place in the psychological fabric, however, proceeds not merely from the influence which the intellect and will exercise upon them, but concurrently upon the fact that they are sensory powers and therefore proportioned subjectively to the external senses and the passions. Both authors assume this in their teaching and allude to the organic associations of these powers.[65] Without especially highlighting the point, they also furnish the formal reason why we know that these senses are parts of the sensitive nature rather than the intellective, namely, that their objects are concrete, individual singulars, and this is the distinguishing formality of sense experience.[66]

In speaking here of the importance which Dr. Terruwe attaches to the internal senses, only passing attention has been given to the cogitative power. It must be said that if the internal senses are fundamental in her understanding of neurosis and repression, then the estimative or cogitative with its associate, the reminiscence, is the very keystone of it. For this reason, the second section of the third chapter of this study is devoted entirely to it.

The Concept of Proportion Between Object and Faculty

Introduction

The preceding topics in this study reflect the importance of the principle of the proportion of the object with a faculty in the doctrine of St. Thomas and Dr. Terruwe. It is now timely to delve more closely into her doctrine on this principle and to compare it with St. Thomas' teaching.

The eminence and proportion of powers and objects

Early in her study, Dr. Terruwe states, "There is a necessary and essential relationship between a faculty and its object, because a faculty or power is directed to a specific object and necessarily belongs to the same order."[67] It may be noted that the intimacy of this relationship is, indeed, reflected in the logic of defining faculties and objects, for one cannot be defined without the other, since there is a transcendental relationship between them.[68]

To return to the passage just quoted, however, it can be seen that it is both a statement of the principle and an amplification of it. Dr. Terruwe explains her reference to belonging to the same order by indicating on the one hand that the identity of the order involves concorporated, material powers responding to and influencing material objects, and on the other hand, immaterial powers interacting with immaterial objects.[69] Such a correspondance is an expression of a more fundamental and generic Thomistic principle, namely, that operation follows upon being, with being taken as prior to operation not only in time and generation but in nature.

In enunciating this principle, however, Dr. Terruwe in no way curtails the scope of immaterial powers from including objects of lower powers in their operations. Proportionality is preserved by the loftier formality by which material objects are related to higher powers, and this proportionality makes the dominion of the higher powers possible.[70] This dominion is expressive of the principle of eminence and is based on the more inclusive formal object of a power.

The proportion of powers and acts

The general principle of the proportion of objects-to-acts-to-powers is the invoked to infer the nature of a power from the nature of actions, as when Dr. Terruwe points out that the fact that a man can infer that he possesses a spiritual faculty from the fact that he possesses abstract ideas.[71]

The more generic principle which enunciates the proportional link of an operation to the being of a power is pertinent to the association of knowledge and appetition; this is because the act or operation of appetition proceeds from the state of accidental being, namely, being informed by a knowable and appetible object. As St. Thomas says, "To be understanding and sensing actually is not a substantial mode of existing but an accidental one to which the intellect and sense are directed."[72] Whether this accidental being is a modification of a material sensory power at one level or another or whether it is on the intellective level, it results in a proportionate appetite, as Dr. Terruwe points out:

> And according to the Thomistic principle that every cognitive principle is accompanied by its proper appetite, as the cognitive powers are more perfectly developed in higher forms of sensory

> life, the corresponding appetites will likewise be more refined until they reach their highest perfection in man.[73]

This perfectibility and proportionality of appetites in relation to the elevation of knowledge corresponds with the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas concerning the emergence of cognitive faculties in successively higher forms of animal life; according to this doctrine higher cognitive powers always presuppose the presence and operation of the lower powers[74] and are associated with appetitive powers belonging to the same genus, either sensitive or intellective.[75]

Dr. Terruwe employs these principles to infer the existence and nature of internal senses such as the estimative and recall[76] and the intellect and its appetite, the will.[77] But they also serve to establish the correspondence of the sense appetites with the cognitive powers, and that consists in the association of the pleasure appetite with the external senses, common sense, and imagination, and the association of the utility appetite with the estimative and recall.[78] There is a grid, as it were, of proportionate, interlocking powers here, and Dr. Terruwe's teaching closely parallels St. Thomas' doctrine in the Summa, I, 78, 4, corp. The significance of it in a doctrine of proportionality is that it is a step by which a line is crossed between psychological impression and expression.

The analogies of proportionality suggested by the application of these principles to both processes invite a closer look at St. Thomas' doctrine on the proportionality of powers, acts, and objects. It will be seen to be more inclusive than that in Dr. Terruwe's book, and the requirements of Dr. Terruwe's study and clinical practice should not be thought to exhaust St. Thomas' doctrine, especially since, as will be seen, he establishes a clear connection between the logical and ontological principles.

The inductive application of the principle of proportion

In the last analysis, these principles of proportion can be used to explain why a known power acts or does not act in a certain way with reference to particular objects, and Dr. Terruwe applies them in this way in her diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. For such an application belongs to the deductive process in a science and readily assists the art associated with a given science.

But as the principle of proportionality is used in the process of scientific discovery and investigation by both authors, they are governed by the dialectical premise that one must begin inquiry with what is more known to the investigator and advance from there, in this particular case, to the obscurities of the faculties. The inductive process rests upon the supposition that some kind of powers exist based on the subject's awareness of various activities and especially upon his awareness of objects which concern him.

It must be noted in St. Thomas' methodology in applying this principle, he does not ask what powers exist; rather, he asks how it is that we know of them, how they are, how they are distinguished, and so forth. This is to proceed from a scientific doubt rather than from an absolute doubt, which in fundamental psychological questions is unresolvable.

The investigative application of these principles is elaborated by St. Thomas in these terms:

> Thus objects are prior to operations of the soul in the sequence of defining. Hence, for the same reason that determinations about acts are made before those about powers, it will be necessary to make determinations concerning objects before those concerning acts. The objects, however, are like food with respect to the vegetative, the sensible with regard to the sense, and the intelligible with respect to the intellect. But it must be known that

> acts and powers of the soul are not differentiated according to diverse objects unless there has been a difference of objects insofar as they are objects, that is, according to the formal nature of the object, such as the visible or the audible.[79]

St. Thomas bases these statements on the premise that a power bespeaks a relationship to an act, in terms of which it is a principle of doing or experiencing something.[80] He goes on to say that the faculties of the soul are either active or passive, that the objects of passive powers are agents reducing the power to act, and that the objects of the active powers are ends or things that are affected.[81] The Summa[82] contains the same conclusions, but without the references to the procedure of defining quoted above.

The validity of the principle of proportionality

If the principle of proportionality is fundamental in Dr. Terruwe's teaching, then a great deal rests on the validity of its application. Part of the scope of St. Thomas' doctrine is to establish that validity. This is a matter of relating being and learning. Thus, in the case of either the active or the passive powers, the proportionality of objects with faculties is not only an investigative principle disclosing the distinctions of powers, but it is an actual cause of the diversity as well.

The matter can be rightly expressed in reverse, which is to say that actions are the ends or purposes of operative powers, whether active or passive, and thus they are indicators of diversity because they are the final causes of diversity.[83] This, of course, reflects the epistomological principal that causes of being are causes of knowing, and in this instance, it is the foundation for the validity of the inferences which have been made.

This involves a per se line of causality in which the action of the power is the final cause of the power, since all operative powers, whether active or passive, naturally have action as their final cause.[84] The line of formal causality, however, must be distinguished, because with a passive power, the object is an extrinsic formal cause, since the object brings about change in the passive power. But the formal causality associated with an active power proceeds, as it were, from it to the object or end in which the form is elicited.

It is clear in St. Thomas' teaching that however the formal causality arises, the object of the act is involved as a specifying principle:

> A power as such is spoken of in relation to an act. Hence a power must be defined by its act, and the powers in turn distinguished from one another inasmuch as their acts are different. Now acts derive their species from their objects, because if they are the acts of passive powers, their objects are ends. Now the species of an operation must be considered in both of these ways.[85]

From the foregoing it is clear that it is in the operation of the passive powers, that the line of final and formal causality is the most direct, since the object is an agent. Since all the sensitive powers and the possible intellect are passive powers,[86] the causality of objects upon powers validates the principle of proportionality as an investigative principle and justifies its being employed so widely.

It should be noted that the sense appetites and the will are included among the passive powers[87] because they are reduced to act by an object in cognition. This is a seemingly paradoxical classification, but St. Thomas offers the rationale for it:

> An active power is not distinguished from a passive one by the fact that it exercises an operation because, since there is some

> operation of any power of the soul whether active or passive, any power of the soul would be active. The distinction of these powers, however, is learned by the relation of the power to its object. For if an object addresses the power as a patient and as something changed, then the power will be active; however, if on the contrary it addresses the power as something active and moving it, then the power will be passive. And so it is that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, because the food is changed by the power of the soul both for nutrition and growth. But the sensitive powers are all passive, because they are moved and reduced to act by sensible objects. Regarding the intellect, however, one power is active and the other is passive.[88]

The will is passive in the same way as the sense appetites, except that it is moved by intelligible objects and ends. This, however, in no way minimizes the will's efficient causality, which follows from its being reduced to act. Since the will is movens motum, two different types of causality are involved, according to St. Thomas:[89] the good known by the intellect moves the will as an object and end; contariwise, the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul subject to it as an efficient cause. But, a known object must first reduce it to act.

Thus, the validity of the principle of proportionality rests ultimately on the nature of passive powers. Dr. Terruwe does not dwell on their characteristics, although her work reflects their importance.

The passive powers as the basis of validity

Hence it is timely to round out the doctrine on proportionality by completing what has already been said about the passive powers. In the first place, it is important to realize that active powers and passive powers are alike as contrasted with entitative powers. Thus they are often called active or passive operative powers, in that both have actions or operations. The distinguishing feature between them is whether the object is an end or an agent, as indicated above.

From another point of view, St. Thomas distinguishes them in these terms, "So in the first place an active power is ordered to do something, but a passive power is ordered to being."[90] ("Primo quidem igitur potentia activa ad agere est, potentia autem passiva ad esse.") Because of this, a passive power which is ordered to accidental being belongs reductively to the genus of accident as a principle rather than as a complete species.[91] The agent, of course, furnishes the corresponding active principle.

Regarding the cognitive powers, Gredt offers two further clarifications: he points (#465.4) that such powers are operative because they efficiently produce knowledge; but they are called passive because their action is immanent; it stays within the particular power. Secondly, they do not change an object but are changed by receiving an impressed species.

In the doctrine of proportionality, then, this leads to the recognition that psychological impression is a matter of powers proportioned to and moved by objects, whereas psychological expression proceeds toward ends and terms from powers activated by known objects or subject to such powers.

In either case, the object of the operation is either joined with the person by means of a likeness or species in cognition, or else the person is assimilated to it in a certain way by means of inclination in appetition.[92] Knowledge and appetition are both changes in a person, but only appetition is also a change of a person. Ultimately it is these kinds of unity between objects, ends, and powers that give proportionality its expression.

The Penetration of the Sense Life by the Intellect and Will

Introduction

Up to this point it has been seen that Dr. Terruwe's acceptance

of a faculty psychology and a subordination of powers has carried with it the implications of trains of causality, the inference of internal senses, and an underlying concept of proportionality in terms of which everything fits together. This well-ordered continuum is violated by repression as was shown earlier, and the essence of repression in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine was seen to be the interdicting of reason's influence in behavior. It remains, therefore, to see how Dr. Terruwe emphasizes the role of intelligence in behavior, or, to use her term, to see why the penetration of the lower powers by reason is so important.

Terruwe on penetration liberating the apprehensive powers

Dr. Terruwe favors the term penetration of the lower powers by the intellect, and conversely, St. Thomas frequently speaks of lower powers participating in intellect or reason. These complementary terms are useful in addressing the doctrine of both authors.

Dr. Terruwe variously characterizes the penetration as illuminating, guiding, and pervading the other powers and their acts, and this happens both directly and through the will, effecting both cognitive powers and appetitive ones. What happens can be discovered by an analysis of her use of these terms.

To begin with the cognitive side, she teaches that the intellect depends on the senses and on the sense knowledge which is presented to the intellect to be "illuminated."[93] This illumination can be either speculative or practical in intent, but in both, the intellect penetrates the limitations of sensory knowledge.[94] This means that it leaves behind the aspects of an individual which isolate it as a numerical singular, affected by particular circumstances, registering only on the sensory level.

It thus proceeds, either in the speculative or the practical order in a mode of freedom, which is to say that factors of singularity which limit or compel, as it were, the known object and the senses fail to compel the intellect. Proceeding speculatively, it forms arts and sciences transcending the individual, and practically, it lays down rules of behavior and values.[95] It is here that both the cognitive and the appetitive powers are most especially influenced with reference to neurosis, and the act of illuminating is translated into guidance. Dr. Terruwe enlarges upon this:

> To understand this process we must realize that rational guidance means that the purely sensory object of the emotion becomes a rational sensory object; and as the sensory appetite by nature tends to obey reason, it will make this rational sensory object its goal.[96]

This is the situation which she contrasts with repression, in which the object becomes the object of the utility appetite rather than of the pleasure appetite and reason. It should be noted, indeed, that in this context, when she speaks of the sensory appetite, she means the pleasure appetite.

The effect of this kind of guidance is going to be analogous to the freedom or lack of coercion which gives rise to speculative knowledge. It means that in appetition, intellectual guidance deprives sensation of its compelling influence on the passions. This starts with the curbing, so to speak, of the external senses by the fact that their objects are seen in the light of the universal and thereby lose some of their forcefulness. This diminution occurs simply because the intellect knows more and better.[97]

The matter does not stop there, however, since an even more important effect is produced on the internal senses, and this is not the same

as the simple manipulation of the other senses by the efficient causality of the will. This latter constitutes one aspect of penetration, to be sure, but the more abiding penetration proceeds from the fact that "what appears as good to a sensory appetite must be judged good by what intellect knows."[98]

Penetration maturing the cogitative power

But there is a chasm here between the sensory singular and the universal of the intellect. Thus, analogous to the illuminating, uplifting role of the immaterial agent intellect,[99] there needs to be a particularizing process implementing the practical judgement of the reason, and this translation is judgemental, and it influences the appetites. This penetration takes place in the cogitative power and its ally, the reminiscence.

What happens is that the intellect's knowledge of what is useful or harmful to a man is cognitively assimilated by the cogitative power[100] on the strength of its sensory orientation to the useful and harmful. An affinity is thereby established with the higher reason, for it is influenced by reason on its own terms, a commonality resting on the estimative's natural object.

Because it is cognitive and because the power of experience is there to retain the impressions, the penetration is not merely occasional, but more or less permanent.

Dr. Terruwe characterizes the penetration of a purely sensitive power by reason as "one of the most important developmental processes of the human mind," because the aspect of usefulness and harmfulness figures in almost every act making the transition from the cognitive to the

appetitive.[101] It brings about the growth from "a vague imperfect sensing to a complete and mature faculty."[102] Once more, the effect is to open up options to the otherwise blind train of sensory cognition-appetition, and in particular the utility appetite is not compelled to act blindly upon the pulse of the pleasure appetite.[103]

Some effects of penetration seen by Terruwe

But if this seems like a somewhat disembodied effect, it is an equally important effect in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine that purely sensory experiences are ennobled and sanctioned by reason without diminution of their sensory or sensual character,[104] and she even goes on to identify this as the psychological basis for the virtue of charity.[105] This particular effect of penetration takes place because man's knowledge of the universal aspects of good shifts the emphasis of interest from the singular, concrete, rather egocentric good by leading him to an appreciation of the good of others subsumed under the universal concept of good.

An opposite effect can also proceed from the penetration of the cogitative power's act by reason, if this penetration is premature[106] or involves error.[107] Either situation can work through the cogitative's natural influence on the utility appetite and become the source of repression. This is contrary to the normal effect of the intellect's penetration, which is to free the estimative from judging an object solely on the basis of whether it falls within the abilities of the utility appetite.

It is fairly clear, then, from a reading for Dr. Terruwe's study that the concept of penetration of the lower powers by the intellect in a secondary sense involves reason working through the efficient causality of the will. But more importantly, it means that the intellect exerts an

almost environmental influence on sense knowledge, putting sense knowledge in a larger overshadowing context, as it were, not efficiently but cognitively, with the cogitative as the point of contact and with ramifications going out cognitively from there to the other senses and the sense appetites.

Passive powers overreaching themselves

It remains to see, however, how this relates to St. Thomas' doctrine of participation. He sets up the problem or the paradox of sensory powers with rational objects when he observes that the sensory cognitive and appetitive powers display operations which seem to overreach the principle, which he cites from Aristotle's Metaphysics, that a passive power does not extend itself to more than its corresponding active power.[108]

Thus, the sensory cognitive power, that is, the cogitative, apprehends and compares impressions such as friendship and danger which do not register on the external senses, and he attributes this to the association [coniunctionem] of the sense power to a rational soul.

Likewise, the bent of the irascible towards objects that do not gratify the senses he attributes to the fact that the sensitive nature touches upon [attingit] the intellective nature. He amplifies this thought by showing that such a bent expresses itself in a relating of unpleasant means to a pleasant end or the segregation of the pleasant in the unpleasant. These, he insists, are properly the works of reason. Nevertheless, they belong to the sensitive nature "according as it attains to the rational nature by some imperfect participation, not by actual inferring and discriminating, but by a natural instinct it is moved toward such an object.[109] (". . . secundum quod attingit per quamdam imperfectam participationem ad rationalem, non quidem conferendo vel discernendo, sed

naturali instinctu movetur in illud.") The key term here is imperfect participation.

He poses the same paradox in his commentary on the De Anima.[110] Turning from the irascible to a related faculty, he makes a comparison of the cogitative in man and the estimative in animals, according to which man apprehends an individual object in terms of some common nature; for instance, the cogitative registers a man as a man and a tree as a tree, whereas in an animal the object is nothing more than a term or principle of some action or passion. He attributes this difference to the fact that the cogitative is "united to the intellective power in the same subject." ("unitur intellectivae in eodem subjecto.") This attribution results from what he says just previously in the same text:

> Apprehension of this type occurs in man through the cogitative power, which is also called the particular reason, because it makes comparisons of universal concepts. Nevertheless, this power is in the sensitive power; the sensitive power at its height participates something of the intellective power in man, in whom the sense is joined to the intellect.[111]

The unqualified affirmation that the cogitative remains throughout a sensory power lends some meaning to the passage quoted above that the participation is imperfect. He further specifies the limitations of the cogitative in this passage:

> The cogitative does not have a relationship to the possible intellect by which a man understands, except through its act whereby phantasms are prepared to be rendered actually intelligible by the agent intellect and made perfective of the possible intellect.[112]

It suggests, for instance, that the will may be said to participate the nature of the intellect perfectly, in the sense that it shares the same

grade of immaterial being. Here, though, there is no hint of an entitative union or a transference in which a sensory power has one foot, as it were, on intellectual grounds. Rather, to return to St. Thomas' doctrine in his commentary on the Sentences, a resolution of what happens can be found in a principle borrowed from an earlier author. St. Thomas says:

> So, just as Denis says in the seventh chapter of De Divinis Nominibus, "the divine wisdom links the ends of beginnings with the beginnings of succeeding things," so also every lower nature at its utmost touches the threshold of a higher nature, although defectively; therefore both in the apprehension and in the sensitive appetite something is found in which the sensitive power touches the reason.[113]

Participation mediated by the cogitative

It is evident from this that St. Thomas and Dr. Terruwe are in agreement that the cogitative is at the axis of penetration or participation, but the question remains, what is the something in which the connection is made.

As seen in Dr. Terruwe's teaching, the answers seem to be partly in efficient causality, partly in cognitive information, and St. Thomas agrees in this: speaking of the appetites he says,

> And similarly the lower appetite, although it retains something of its proper movement, is nevertheless moved in the natural order of things by the movement of the higher appetite and by the movement of reason deliberating.[114]

This line of movement by reason itself corresponds with what Dr. Terruwe's teaching discloses, and it is therefore to be pursued. St. Thomas furnishes the appetitive-cognitive relationship here when he observes:

> It must be said that although some powers of the sensitive part are common to us and to brute animals, nevertheless in us they have a certain excellence deriving from the fact that they are joined to reason; hence, we, in superiority to other animals, have the cogitative and reminiscence in the sensitive part . . . And by this means the sense appetite in us has a certain excellence over other animals, namely, that it is its nature to obey the reason.[115]

If the concept of the threshold and of obedience can be related, the meaning of participation and penetration can be better understood. St. Thomas' reference to obedience must be taken in a metaphorical sense, but it is verified in the fact that cognitive faculties mediate the sense appetites to the reason. Thus, as efficient causality suggests a certain manipulation of the lower powers by the will, St. Thomas' thought seems to associate participation more with the cognitive line of causality, especially as it involves the cogitative.

In an analogy resting on the orientation already mentioned of the utility-achievability-harm orientation of the estimative in animals and the cogitative in man, St. Thomas points out that the irascible is not moved simply by the apprehension of an object, but rather in man it waits upon the judgement or opinio of reason and in animals upon a similar estimative composition of an object with the value of use, harm, and so forth.[116]

This judgemental, cognitive influence is ilucidated further by St. Thomas when he points to the two compositive faculties in man, the universal reason on the intellective level and the particular reason on the sensory level and then goes on to say that this combination makes possible acts of pleasure with reason [concupiscentia cum ratione] and the movement of the sense appetite by the universal reason. This latter takes place, he says, "mediante imaginatione particulari," "by the mediation of the image or species of the particular reason."[117]

This dovetails with his doctrine of the subordinated causes in sequence of cognition and appetition. The essence of this is that the cogitative or the passive intellect is not sufficient to explain rationally orientated behavior, since this faculty of itself is concerned with singulars. In such behavior universal values or judgements have a causative role, too, and these proceed from the possible intellect.[118] This converse thought is developed with the premise that behavior directed at an individual object cannot be explained by the functions of the universal and the particular.[119]

This need for proportion is supplied by the judgement of the particular reason and St. Thomas states the relationship in these terms:

> That which is universal moves as a primary and resolving cause, but the particular reason moves as a proximate cause and one applied, as it were, to movement. For operations and movements are ordered to particulars; hence it is necessary that the universal judgement be applied to particulars.[120]

The role of cognitive causality in participation

The key here is that the process is not mechanical or of itself an expression of efficient causality; it is cognitional and judgemental, because it is articulated in St. Thomas' presentation, in terms of a practical syllogism, in which the universal reason formulates a general principle, such as "parents should be honored," and the particular reason furnishes the minor term, in effect, "this is a parent," which verifies the relevency of the general principle to the option at hand.[121] Efficiency enters into this in an ancillary role, since the higher reason is seen as manipulating phantasms in its deliberative process, but this is ordered to the judgemental sequence, not to a transient action.

Thus, the matter of penetration or participation consists for both authors in cognitive, immanent actions in which the lower shares in an action or activity with the higher power as a subordinated cause, a per se cause, as a formal cause. The cognitive powers, of course, are efficient causes of their own action, but in the genesis of appetitive acts toward which this subordination is orientated, they are formal. St. Thomas furnishes a perspective for this in his teaching that the sense appetites obey the reason as regards the form of their acts, but the will as regards the execution of acts.[122]

Dr. Terruwe's concept of the penetration of the lower powers by the reason, as presented in this study, is largely limited to the fact that penetration happens and that ultimately the eminence of the reason over the other powers is responsible for it. This is sufficient for the purpose she has in her study, but as has been seen, St. Thomas offers a more thorough resolution of the process and thereby shows how it happens.

The permanence of participation

There is one further note that may be made of Dr. Terruwe's teaching; she does not investigate here the question of whether the penetration is per modum actus -- coextensive with individual acts -- or whether it is of a more abiding character.

In St. Thomas' doctrine of participation, what begins with individual acts does become a permanent modification and perfection of the lower powers, and this takes place with the formation of the operative habits or virtues. The sensitive powers are susceptible of this perfection to the extent that their several functions are not determined to one thing but operate under the command of reason.[123] As St. Thomas says,

"It is the nature of the sensitive powers to obey the command of reason, and therefore, certain habits can be in them; for according as they obey reason, they are said in a certain way to be rational."[124]

This capacity for habits is found not only in the appetitive powers, but in the apprehensive ones as well, and, while excluding the external senses, St. Thomas expressly mentions the cogitative and memorative powers in this connection.[125] Ultimately, the habitual penetration of the sense powers by reason results from the fact that they are passive powers and moved movers, with the result that through repeated actions habits are formed which perfect their actions with regard to particular objects.[126]

The notion of passive powers has been seen at the roots of the doctrine of proportionality and as a fundamental element resolving the problems of penetration. It leads inevitably to a consideration of the active agency which corresponds with it, and this is the topic of the next section.

The Role of Objective Causality in Psychological Function

Introduction

In studying Dr. Terruwe's work, the student is easily aware of the articulating principles in her adoption of Thomistic psychology: the subordination of powers, the mediating role of the internal senses, the pervasive influence of causality operating through proportionate faculties and investing the psycholcgical fabric with the values of the intellect. It has been seen a number of times that these principles depend for their efficacy on the fact that almost all of the sensitive and intellective powers are passive powers, moved movers, receptive to forms of being.

The doctrine of passive powers is closely related to a collateral principle which has been alluded to already but which deserves mention because of its importance in Dr. Terruwe's work and in rational psychology. This principle is the fact of causality per modum objecti, by way of an object, or objective causality, in the genesis of psychological function.

The nature of objective causality

This must be singled out because it is psychological causality par excellence: it is so because it consists in the activating of a power through an object, or, more remotely, through the functions leading to the presentation or reception of an object. Thus, objective causality is an analogous term here, suggesting not only formal causality, but also, remotely, whatever types of efficient and dispositive causality figure in bringing a form to bear upon a passive power.

The essence of this is that a form is received non-compositively as a form of something else. Instead of constituting a new thing with the passive power, it acquires intentional being in the faculty.[127] The significance of this type of causality from a doctrinal point of view is that it transcends mechanistic theories of knowledge and theories which stop at the neurological level, because it goes beyond natural changes in the cognitive powers and achieves an immanent action rather than a merely transient one.[128] This immanence is pertinent to appetition and to cognition, since it is axiomatic that nothing is desired unless known, and even the appetitive faculties must in a certain way be cognitive if they are to know or respond to the objects of the cognitive powers.

Objective causality in Terruwe's doctrine

Dr. Terruwe's doctrine admits this type of causality more by

implication than by actual mention, but when she does allude to it, it appears in a role of decisive importance. In her doctrine on the conflict of the sense appetites which constitute repression, it is clear that objective causality is the mediating causality, without which repression cannot take place. This is because appetites are entirely responsive to known objects, and whatever controls the objects controls the appetites.

Thus she says that in the conflict of strivings that leads to neurosis, there is or may be both an inner striving which is aroused by an object in the senses, or more especially, in the imagination, and there is also a motor activity. Repression may merely prevent the motor activity or it may take the more severe form of attempting to efface the image which aroused the striving.[129] In her own words:

> At this point, we ask how the repressing emotion achieves this effect in these cases. This is possible only through repression of the cognitive image. For a sensory striving like every human striving, is associated with previous knowledge. One strives for that which is known, even on a sensory level. As long as the cognitive image exists, the striving can follow. Therefore, if the repressing emotion wants to subdue the striving, it must make the cognitive image disappear from the imagination. And this is what happens.[130]

She goes on to show that in the first stage of repression, there may simply be a turning away from the image, but in the second the imagination is forbidden to reproduce the image, and various kinds of withdrawal will even accompany this in the interests of shutting out unwanted impressions.[131]

It was mentioned above that objective causality, as illustrated here, is a somewhat ambiguous term, implying in reality several types of causality. This may be clarified by St. Thomas' teaching on the causality of the passions or of the acts of the sense appetite.

Because this is a matter of immanent action, concepts of causality are necessarily analogous; they cannot be applied with the same rigor with which they are in the transient actions from which they are derived. Nevertheless, the ramifications of St. Thomas' doctrine on causality in cognition and appetition disclose the mighty influence which objective causality exerts in behavior and how it supports Dr. Terruwe's theories.

Thomistic loci for the doctrine of objective causality

In his doctrine on the will, St. Thomas teaches that the will is specified in its acts by the object in knowledge,[132] and this object is presented by the intellect. But the will's appetitive response to this object can be affected by the dispositive influence of the passions, and St. Thomas characterizes this influence as the sense appetite moving the will "ex parte objecti," "on the part of the object."[133] This is, of course, an indirect influence, and even though it involves a material disposition, as it were, of the will, it attaches to the object.

St. Thomas develops this idea somewhat in a later article when he says:

> Passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will from the direction by which the will is moved by an object: thus, a man disposed to some extent through passion judges something to be good and fitting which one acting without passion would not judge.[134]

In his tract on the sense appetites or the acts of passions, St. Thomas constructs a corresponding doctrine; he points out that just as the cause of love is good "per modum objecti," "by way of being an object," knowledge is a cause in the same way, since the appetite depends on the object's being known.[135] The amplitude of this convergence of causes is

perhaps best expressed in his introduction to the relation of love and fear, in which he prepares to show how love can be causative of fear:

> I reply that it has to be said that the objects of the passions of the soul address them as forms do natural or artificial things, because the passions receive their species from objects, just as the aforementioned things receive them from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is the cause of the form is the cause of the thing constituted by it, so also, whatever is the cause of the object, and in whatsoever way, is the cause of the passion. However, it happens that something is the cause of the object either by way of an efficient cause or in the manner of a material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is an apparent, befitting, conjoined good; its efficient cause is that which makes the connection, or that which makes the fittingness or the goodness or even the appearance of this kind of good. However, the cause, by way of material disposition, is a habit or any disposition according to which that good, which is joined to him, becomes seemly or apparent to him.[136]

What he has to say concerning the objective influences on the passions, may, of course, be said all the more of the influences on the cognitive powers themselves, as is suggested above by the influence of the passions on the reason. Indeed, even the organs of external and internal sensation exert this kind of influence. St. Thomas' references to injuries to the organs of sense are commonplace in his doctrine, as is his recognition of qualitative differences in the organs affecting the acuity of cognition.[137]

Functional and clinical importance of objective causality

The implications of recognizing objective causality in psychological function result from the fact that this is a point of access to the behavioral processes. Thus, anything which can exert an influence on the object, either in itself or in knowledge, in its character or in its presentation, on the receptivity of the cognitive or of the appetitive

faculties, can gain a bearing on the whole complex of psychological functions. The compass of this potental is disclosed in numerous facits of Dr. Terruwe's teaching.

In addition to the actual repressive process achieved by interdiction of the cognitive image, which has already been mentioned, there are other applications of this principle in her doctrine. These range from the derogatory interpretation made of a sensory object of a repressing emotion by the cogitative and presented to the intellect[138] to the object-extension of neurosis by associational assimilation of similar objects and by the intellectual expansion of objects.[139] The latter phenomenon occurs, according to Dr. Terruwe, in more intelligent patients and exemplifies her finding that the more intelligent the patient, the deeper the repressive process tends to go. It may be further seen that the reticulated presence of this type of causality explains not only normal function and pathology, but must inevitably figure in fruitful therapy as well.

CHAPTER III

DIFFERENCES: TERRUWE ILLUMINATING THOMISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Dr. Terruwe's work is professedly a resolution of the findings of modern psychiatry in the structure of rational psychology as taught by St. Thomas. Indeed, as has been seen, she started with St. Thomas' teaching and reviewed empirical findings in the light of that teaching in order to accomplish the resolution. Thus, it follows that where the two authors are concerned with rational psychology itself, there is an almost perfect concurrence of doctrine; this study so far has consisted of documenting that parallelism and amplifying aspects of it.

However, a particularly instructive element of Dr. Terruwe's work is the difference which she occasionally displays in her teaching in the area of rational psychology. The differences center chiefly on the utility appetite and the cogitative power. On the one hand, the differences are of emphasis rather than of substance, but on the other, they help to give her book its orientation, since in her doctrine, these two faculties are the moving forces generating repression. Although her general doctrine involves rational psychology illuminating empirical findings, this difference of emphasis may be assumed to proceed from the empirical findings to rational psychology. It thus constitutes Dr. Terruwe as something of a commentator on St. Thomas, and her emphasis contributes to a better understanding of St. Thomas' writings.

Since the cogitative relates to the irascible as a cause to an effect, this study will begin with differences concerning the irascible and proceed from there to the cogitative.

Emphasis on Utility in the Irascible

Introduction

The distinction of the pleasure appetite from the utility appetite has already been seen, and it is based on whether the object is simply good or repugnant, or whether its attraction or repulsion is associated with some degree of difficulty. This is the traditional way of stating the differences; from another point of view it can be seen that the pleasure appetite is concerned with ends, the utility appetite with means, and this orientation is the one Dr. Terruwe uses, and it reflects the difference of emphasis from St. Thomas.

Discretionary objects as useful and achievable

Dr. Terruwe first suggests this difference when she says in identifying the two sense appetites, "The second is called the irascible appetite. We would prefer to call the latter the utility appetite because the word gives a much better description of the functions of this power."[1] She then says, "It is not directly concerned with pleasure and displeasure, but it pursues the means by which they may be obtained or avoided."[2]

The pertinence of this term, utility, in her doctrine is a consequence of her doctrine on the cogitative power, which will be studied in the next section. Suffice it here to borrow Dr. Terruwe's comment on the cogitative:

> The estimative power, which judges usefulness and harmfulness in general under the influence of the intellect, will also judge the

> value of past experiences for subsequent particular operations. Thus the estimative power becomes in man a faculty which is of the utmost importance in his life. For in all man's acts, except those which are purely pleasureable acts, the aspect of usefulness plays a role to some degree. For all practical purposes one may say that man employs this faculty almost continually.[3]

Thus the object of the irascible or utility appetite is a judgemental one; both authors agree on this.

St. Thomas says that the objects of the irascible are such that they require a comparison, a judgement,[4] and this is because two variables are involved, which are at least partial principles of the appetite's movement. On the one side, he says that the irascible passions themselves are distinguished on the basis of whether or not, in the judgement of the estimative, the subject is equal to the difficulty presented by the object. If the subject judges that he is equal, then hope or daring is stirred; otherwise fear or despair arises.[5] In the Summa[6] St. Thomas puts it in terms of whether the object is achievable or escapable. Thus the subject must judge his own capacity in relation to the object.

On the other side, the object is not an end in itself and must therefore be recognized or judged to be a means, and it is only as such that it can exercise an attraction. Consequently, some good must be discerned in it.[7]

This approaches the crux of the differences between the doctrines of St. Thomas and Dr. Terruwe. Dr. Terruwe's emphasis on use and utility is teleological and stresses the concept of the object as a means to an end of the subject's aspiration. St. Thomas' emphasis of arduum and difficile stresses achievability, the proportion of the subject's capacities to the object.

Loci of the Thomistic doctrine on difficulty

The concept of arduousness goes beyond semantics and tends to convey the impression of remote, almost unassailable objects in contrast to Dr. Terruwe's concept of use and the useful, which have connotations of the ordinary and the routine. St. Thomas' language discloses this: "It must be said that the object of the irascible is not good or evil absolutely, but with the added circumstance of arduousness."[8] ("Dicendum quod irascibilis objectum non est bonum et malum absolute, sed addita circumstantia arduitatis.") The object of the irascible is "the good itself according as it has the aspect of the arduous or the difficult."[9] ("Ipsum bonum secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis.") "The object . . . of the irascible is a good which, however, has a difficulty."[10] ("Objectum . . . irascibilis autem bonum quod difficultatem habet.") The spectre of the object is further amplified in his comments that the irascible is always concerned with the future[11] and that a degree of magnitude is always implied with reference to the good or evil with which the irascible is concerned, that it is not concerned with facile difficulties.[12]

All of this contributes to the common impression that the Thomistic doctrine on the irascible passions assigns a heroic rating to them. The term irascible is not original with St. Thomas, and it doubtless derives from the naming of a power by derivation from its most conspicuous expression rather than by what is essential to it. Yet the term re-enforces the heavy emphasis placed on the notion of arduousness and difficulty. It is surely evident from experience that the upper limits of their potential justify this, but this does not have to rule out their more ordinary implementation as seen by Dr. Terruwe. There are allusions in St. Thomas'

writing which suggest a material compatibility of Dr. Terruwe's doctrine with his own, and in these terms the difference of emphasis remains, so that Dr. Terruwe illuminates and clarifies him. On the other hand he supplies the distinctions and details left unexplored in Dr. Terruwe's work; these support her findings and elucidate his own.

Loci of the Thomistic recognition of utility

Dr. Terruwe's mention of her own preference for the term utility, quoted above, implicitly disclaims any borrowing of terms from St. Thomas, and yet he does occasionally use such a term in connection with the irascible and the closely related cogitative power.

In speaking of the cogitative's perception of sense impressions which escape the external senses, he comments:

> But it is necessary for an animal to pursue or flee certain things, not only because they are agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, but also on account of certain other conveniences, and uses, or risks. (Italics mine.)[13]

He then goes on to say with reference to the irascible itself:

> Just as in the apprehensive powers in the sensitive part there is a certain estimative power, namely one which is perceptive of those things which do not affect the external sense, as was said above, so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain power seeking something which is not agreeable according to sense pleasure but according as it is useful to the animal for its defense. And this is the irascible power. (Italics mine.)[14]

The context of defense admittedly sustains the sense of gravity already alluded to, but conversely it has been seen that Dr. Terruwe attributes a reduction in the urgency of man's purely sensory impulses to the illuminating and interpretive influence of the intellect.

In a related passage in which St. Thomas shows the correspondance of the irascible with the intellectually apprehended goods, (and in which he fails to mention the cogitative mediating the latter apprehension), he comments:

> However a thing has the nature of the good and the attractive inasmuch as it is brought to a term or finalized by things which are pleasurable, as if it had to the power of taking possession of [utendi] them at will; and the irascible, which is a sort of defender of the concupiscible, is ordered to this.[15]

The sense of utendi in the passage prevents a derivative translation in this context. Indeed, St. Thomas may be enlisting the analogies of its meaning to convey his intent. The gender assimilation of propugnatrix, in the place of propugnator, hardly minimizes the colorful picture of the irascible's function, either.

The useful as a means to the pleasurable good

In the succeeding paragraph, St. Thomas immediately proceeds to the dictum that the irascible begins and ends in the concupiscible,[16] and this, in effect, poses the question as to whether the object of the two appetites in actual practice are numerically identified or distinct. In other words, which good is involved? This question leads to an understanding of the utility aspect as Dr. Terruwe sees it, and it also substantiates the close link of the irascible to voluntary motor reactions.

This ambiguity as to objects is quite common and is evident in passages such as, "The irascible is given to animals for this purpose, namely, that the impediments by which the concupiscible is prohibited from tending toward its object are removed."[17] ("Ad hoc irascibilis data est animalibus ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis in suum

objectum tendere prohibetur.") Since removens prohibens is movere per accidens, the irascible evidently does not have a per se effect on either the concupiscible or its object.

The resolution of this ambiguity derives from three considerations: the distinction of the proximate and remote objects of the irascible, the attractive force of the difficult or arduous, and thirdly, the fact that even the irascible has a certain pleasure capacity which resolves the basic appetitive principle, that appetitive movement is toward the good and away from evil.

To begin with the last of these considerations, St. Thomas says, "All movement of the appetitive power is reduced to pursuit or to flight."[18] ("Omnis autem motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam.") In the case of the irascible, the attraction of something finds a corresponding pleasure in the appetite to the extent that something is apprehended as possible of achievement.[19] The reason for this pleasure is that in achieving its proper object, the irascible achieves its own end or perfection, and St. Thomas explicitly attributes this delectation to the irascible and not to the concupiscible.[20] It is a matter of the natural appetite of an appetitive power being satisfied and the proportionality to an object being resolved. Thus, even the evil associated with a concupiscible good can be attractive.

There is a further accidental good attaching to objects of the irascible, and this is the aspect of preciousness attributed to an object by reason of its difficulty.[21]

The next principle in resolving this ambiguity is an understanding of what attraction is exercised by the difficult good or by the difficulty.

St. Thomas teaches that the difficult as such does not attract,[22] because as such it is an evil. In view of the foregoing, his reference here is to the elicited act of the appetitive power. On the other hand, the difficult is appetible inasmuch as it is ordered to another appetible, or even as it has some good which is mingled with the difficulty. Obviously, the former is its goodness as a means, and this is associated with the perfection of the irascible referred to above. However, the latter goodness does not seem likely to exercise much influence without the goodness of means.

An inference to be drawn from the foregoing is that in the term bonum difficile or difficult good, it is indeed the term bonum or good connoting means, which is the substantive, and difficult is the qualifier. The opposite cannot be resolved appetitively, and metaphysically, difficulty cannot exist except with reference to an end and an agent. Thus, it cannot be found of itself but only in association with a means, that is, with a good.

This transcendental relationship of the difficult and the means prevents them from being separated in their physical essence, and for this reason and also because appetition happens in the physical order, the difficult good cannot in any way except by teleological association be attributed to the concupiscible appetite.

Inasmuch as the attraction of the difficult good is the attraction of a means exercised upon a faculty proportioned to it, it is certainly correct to say that all the objects of the irascible are means, and it is probably correct to say that all means are objects of the irascible. St. Thomas seems to confirm this when he says that the concupiscible is ordered

to receiving what is pleasing, while the irascible is ordered to doing things to overcome obstacles to pleasure.[23]

The aspect of difficulty is in the physical essence of the means, and this is how it can be said to objectify the irascible. But its being in something points to the prior importance of means as such.

Hence the third consideration effecting the question of whether the object of the concupiscible and the irascible are the same or different: St. Thomas distinguishes the immediate and proper object of the irascible from its remote object.[24] The proper object, in which it takes pleasure, as indicated above, is the good with an associated difficulty, that is, the means. Beyond this is the second and ultimate good to which the first is ordered, and this is the concupiscible good which is pleasing in itself.

Both of these are goods of the subject, but as means and ends are distinguished, they are not numerically the same good, either as goods of the powers or goods of the agent subject. Schematically, therefore, it works out this way:



The resolution of the question of objects in terms of an end-means

relationship is the Thomistic basis which sustains Dr. Terruwe's view identifying the useful and the difficult good.

Terruwe's application of the means concept

The importance of the means concept thus resolved and its pertinence to her own doctrine is clear when Dr. Terruwe says,

> It is likewise evident that we, as sensory being, also seek things which of themselves do not give pleasure, but are nevertheless sought because through them we can obtain something else that does give pleasure. For example, a dog will exert considerable effort to obtain a piece of meat which has been placed out of reach. Although the effort itself is not pleasurable, the dog exerts it in order to obtain that which he desires. It is not the pleasure appetite that causes the dog to exert the effort, because that which is difficult cannot constitute the object of the pleasure appetite. Hence, the pleasure appetite can never be moved by difficulty, because of the principle concerning the necessary relationship between faculty and object. Consequently we are forced to postulate the existence of another faculty in the animal, which moves it to seek things that are not desired in themselves but only as useful for obtaining some other pleasurable object. This we call the pleasure appetite.[25]

In a footnote extension of what she says in the foregoing passage, Dr. Terruwe acknowledges the traditional terminology of concupiscible and difficult; then she suggests that the bonum arduum is the same as the bonum utile, and this corresponds with her preference for the term, utility appetite. This assimilation of the means and utility corresponds with St. Thomas' teaching in his commentary on the de Anima, in which he comments that certain goods are praiseworthy because they are useful in order to achieve something.[26]

It relates further to the association which she emphasizes as existing between the utility appetite and the voluntary motor reactions to the locomotive power; she defines such reactions as a response to an

emotion for the purpose of obtaining the goal desired by the emotion,[27] and she holds that this is what St. Thomas means by the vis motrix and the potentia locomotiva. It is not merely muscular, but is expressed by complex specialized movements such as speech and writing.[28] Then she says:

> It is obvious that this motor power is related, not to the pleasure appetite, but to the utility appetite. For movement is a means to attain a sensory object, but an object is sought only by the utility appetite, following upon a practical judgement of the particular reason. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that these cognitive and appetitive faculties be brought into action if movement is to follow.[29]

This is in complete harmony with St. Thomas' teaching referred to above, namely, that the irascible is orientated toward action, although in his terms it is for overcoming what is contrary or threatening.

Conclusion: a difference of causes

Thus, the difference in doctrine of St. Thomas and Dr. Terruwe is a matter of St. Thomas largely proceeding from the qualifying accident of difficulty attaching to the good and specifying the irascible in its being and operation. This involves an emphasis on formal causality, whereas Dr. Terruwe's doctrine emphasizing means and utility is more in the line of final causality. As has been seen, however, St. Thomas' teaching clearly recognizes the aspect of means and utility, which figure so much in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine. This befits a clinician, whose greater preoccupation must be with powers in their actual exercise and with aspects of their physical essence rather than their metaphysical essence.

The Importance of the Cogitative

Introduction

The study of Dr. Terruwe's doctrine on the irascible is inevitably linked with that on the cogitative as has been suggested in the previous section. This is because the utility appetite gets its object from the cogitative. Indeed, it is difficult to consider any facet of Dr. Terruwe's doctrine without recourse to this faculty. It has figured in the importance of the internal senses, the penetration of the sense powers by the intellect, and the doctrine on objective causality. As a result, much has already been said about it, and it therefore remains in this chapter to consider its various aspects in a connected fashion as they are found in the two authors.

The loci of the Thomistic doctrine on the cogitative

To begin with, it must be said that the role of the cogitative as seen by Dr. Terruwe is pivotal. In St. Thomas' doctrine by contrast its formal importance in the articulating of his psychology is approximately the same, but it does not enjoy nearly the material prominence, that is, sheer space in his works, that its formal influence would seem to justify.

There is a tendency for it to be swallowed up in St. Thomas' emphasis on the reason and will in behavior, as is examplified, for instance, in a discussion of hope, in which he contrasts the instinctive responses of animals with the reasonally directed ones of man, without any references to the cogitative.[30] Yet it is the context of discussing the same emotion that he enunciates much of his doctrine about it in his commentary on the Sentences.[31]

It is significant of its rather diminished standing that much of St. Thomas' doctrine on this faculty will be found in articles on other topics, answers to objections, examples, and asides. Thus, as with the other senses, not a single article in the Summa is devoted exclusively to this faculty, and it is formally considered in his commentary on the de Anima in about half a page.[32]

Nevertheless, a complete basic doctrine can be formulated by drawing from the type of sources mentioned above, and it is doubtless a credit to the interests of modern psychology that the matter has acquired a greater importance than it enjoyed in the past. On the other hand, it must be allowed that St. Thomas' preoccupations were generally theological rather than purely behavioral.

The nature and modes of the cogitative

Notwithstanding the scattering of sources for St. Thomas' doctrine, what he has to say enjoys a consistency of expression which approaches the verbatim, and it seems to be very important to take him literally at his word in order to get a clear understanding of his teaching on this subject. This precaution stems from two aspects of his teaching, namely, the frequent analogies drawn between the animal estimative and the human cogitative powers and secondly, the nearly, but not quite synonomous use of the terms estimative, cogitative, particular reason, and passive intellect in his writing.

In sorting out the nature and functions of this power, it becomes clear that he does not use these terms casually. When their meanings are appreciated, the doctrine readily admits of the importance which Dr. Terruwe attaches to it.

For this reason, the points of St. Thomas' doctrine will be resolved first, and then Dr. Terruwe's synthesis will be considered. It seems best to begin with two things: St. Thomas' statement of what, generically, the human cogitative does do and conversely, what the animal estimative does not do.

In the context of discussing the distinction of per se, per accidens, common, and proper sensibles as known by the senses and by the intellect, St. Thomas states that when the subject sees something colored, which is the per se proper object of vision, he perceives it as this particular man or that particular animal, and that it is the cogitative which accomplishes the perception of man, animal, and so forth.[33] The notion of this man or that animal means that the power perceives its object in terms of some commonality or common nature.[34] The aspect of man or animal is not known to the external senses per se, nor is it known per se to the common sense or the imagination.

For when St. Thomas points out that the cogitative knows objects under a common nature (which, however, is not a formal universal), he is implying that the common sense, while pulling together, as it were, the data of the several external senses into a psychological unit, nevertheless goes no farther than the sum of those sensations; it registers the color, texture, odor and so forth of the object as a unit, but not its nature or natural identity.

This is analogous to an artistic medium which may support qualities such as these without their disclosing immediately what the composition is and prompting candid comments in testimony of this.

It is the cogitative which makes the identification, as it were, and it remains to be seen whether this is purely apprehensive or whether

it is in some way compositive. The fact that it happens, however, is immediate evidence of the cogitative's subjective link with the intellect, since the act of identification has connotations of universality about it. The implications of knowing the nature or identity of objects is a potent factor in the uses to which the faculty is put.

At the other end of the spectrum, as it were, is the limitation under which this power operates in animals: in them, its scope is coextensive with the proper acts of the animal subject, and it is purely instinctive, being without subjective association to reason; the result is that the animal estimative does not register anything except what is a term or a principle of some action or passion. St. Thomas is fond of citing the lamb's reaction to a wolf or to the breast as an example of this. Rather than registering under some common nature, this faculty by natural instinct identifies what is edible, what is coital, what is filial, what is harmful, and so forth,[35] and it does this without making a comparison. It is solely apprehensive.[36] Thus, its objects are formally and numerically restricted, and all of them register only insofar as they relate to the subject's animal nature in terms of conservation in being and reproduction,[37] in terms of which the implications of harm and use are included.[38]

The vital importance of this instinctive estimative apprehension lies in the fact that the appetites are not moved immediately by the apprehension of an object. Rather, the object must be invested with the aspect of good or evil, and this apprehension or recognition is performed by the estimative.[39]

These two considerations, namely, the scope of the human cogitative and the limits of the animal estimative, mark out the range of doctrine for

both authors, for both agree that there is a natural estimative in the young child,[40] and the scope of the cogitative lends it sweeping influence in knowledge and appetition. The two terminate the axis upon which the remainder of the doctrine rests.

The implications of these two terms (namely, the limited range of the animal estimative and the quasi-universal knowledge of the human cogitative as suggested by St. Thomas' language) are that the modes of the estimative/cogitative power which are found actually separated as they are distributed among animals and man, are present at least potentially in man and distinguished virtually rather than actually in him. The cogitative is not a different faculty from the estimative in man, but only a more perfect mode of the same faculty.[41]

Thus, an understanding of these powers depends on recognizing the distinction of these modes in man, and it directly relates to Dr. Terruwe's emphasis on the developmental aspects of this power as it proceeds from the primative state to the mature state in normal development.

St. Thomas' doctrine, then, discloses three aspects or functions of this power in man: a natural instinctive estimative function; a cogitative as such, that is, an apprehensive function amplified by association with intellect; and thirdly, a particular reason, that is, a judicative function. The recognition of the first of these, the instinctive estimative function is explicit in St. Thomas' writings, when he states that it exists in infants from the very beginning and is disclosed in their response to the breast and the like.[42]

St. Thomas does not discuss whether this mode becomes inoperative as the others emerge, but Dr. Terruwe seems to indicate in commenting on

sexual awareness in adolescents[43] that it is present. This would mean that the primitive mode is not merely preliminary to the others in absolute life-chronology but in the sequence of acquaintance with new or distinct categories of objects, such as the sexual. Surely, too, it must be operative in first reactions to acute emergencies.

Regarding the latter pair of functions or modes, the cogitative and the judicative particular reason, it will be seen that St. Thomas' language seems to justify distinguishing them consistently with the logical necessity of apprehending two objects of individual impressions before a judgemental composition can be made. This diversity of instinctive, apprehensive, and judicative functions helps to resolve the effects which both authors find in normal and abnormal cognitive and appetitive functions.

The following passages reflect the type of language which has been referred to. In each instance the mention of the cogitative is complimented with a postpositive modifying clause identifying the particular reason with the cogitative, but qualified by the distinguishing feature of the term, particular reason, namely, the collative function. Indeed, the first passage associates apprehension with the cogitative in a way that strongly suggests a distinct function from that of judgement, which is associated with the particular reason.

> An apprehension of this type in man is made by the cogitative power, which is also called the particular reason, because it is collative of individual impressions, just as the universal reason is collative of universal concepts.[44]

> However in place of the estimative power in man, as has been said above, there is the cogitative power; the latter is called by some the particular reason, because it is collative of individual intentions. Hence the sensitive appetite in man is meant to be moved by it.[45]

> But the fact that it apprehends those intentions which do not come under the sense, such as friendship, hatred, and the like is proper to the sensitive part according as it touches upon reason. Hence that part in human beings, in whom it is more perfect because of its conjunction to the rational soul, is called the particular reason, because it makes comparisons concerning particular impressions. However in other animals, because it does not make comparisons, but has the capacity to apprehend intentions of this type by natural instinct, it is not called reason but the estimative.[46]

Analyzing the apprehensive and judicative functions in man is made complicated here, however, by St. Thomas' way of saying that apprehension of certain impressions happens <u>through</u> a comparison rather than instinctively. The following passage is a good example of this:

> But there is a difference regarding the aforesaid impressions; for other animals perceive impressions of this type only by natural instinct, but man also does it by a certain comparison. And therefore what in other animals is called the natural estimative in man is called the cogitative, which arrives at this kind of intentions through a kind of comparison. Hence it is also called the particular reason; . . . for it is collative of individual intentions, just as the intellective reason is of universal intentions.[47]

It is pertinent to add at this point that St. Thomas clearly states that the function of the particular reason proceeds in collaboration with the function of the other powers, and this supports the validity of distinguishing it in terms of its judicative functions; in an aside he says, " . . . however the other is the intellect, which Aristotle calls the passive, which is the particular reason, that is, the cogitative power with the memorative and the imaginative powers."[48] (" . . . Aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, id est vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.") These three powers are frequently linked together in St. Thomas' teaching.

The memorative power is closely associated with the cogitative in St. Thomas' doctrine, and he identifies it as the storehouse of the impressions registered by the cogitative.[49] He goes on to say that the same type of impression stirs the memory of similar impressions in animals, but in humans a knowledge of particulars can be surfaced by the inquisitive promptings of reason investigating and inferring.[50]

Either way, the two are presented for comparison. When St. Thomas speaks of perceiving these objects or their impressions through a comparison, it seems from the passages quoted that an impression is perceived under some common nature and is followed by the perception of the joining of that impression with one supplied by the memorative or the power of experience; it is in that perception of the union of the two impressions that the common nature of the object and also the attribute of harm, use, and so forth are confirmed. This is by analogy to the process of rational judgement, consisting in the apprehension of a subject and a predicate, their comparison, the recognition of predicability, and the judgement or predication.[51] Naturally, however, it proceeds without the sense having a reflex knowledge of its act, as the intellect can.

The scope of the cogitative in apprehension, indicated at the outset by St. Thomas' description of what the cogitative does, does not seem to impose the conclusion that the judgemental function which it prepares for is the sole purpose of its apprehension. The judgemental function works because the cogitative knows natures. That is the basis of it all: the cogitative knows natures. But in man, the judgement or composition leading to an appetitive response does not exhaust the potential of the cogitative. This is how it is that in the doctrine of St. Thomas, the

power contributes to intellection as well as to appetition, whereas in Dr. Terruwe, this is recognized, but is less important to her purposes than the utility-appetitive function.

The larger scope of the cogitative apprehension furnishing data to the intellect, some for appetitive purposes through the function of the practical intellect and some not, is the feature which validates the cogitative's constructive or destructive function human development under the aegis of reason. In the context of subordinated powers, the mighty impact of this sensory faculty on behavior becomes more apparent as one goes beyond Dr. Terruwe's doctrine to the full reaches of St. Thomas' teaching, because it establishes the total anvironmnet, as it were, and puts in releif what Dr. Terruwe has borrowed for clinical purposes.

The cogitative and the speculative - practical intellect

It is clear in St. Thomas' doctrine that the cogitative does not refer merely to the sense appetites, but that it addresses the intellect, and this address itself need not be ancillary to appetition alone. In a passage in which he disproves that the cogitative is the specifying power in man, he offers a particularly informative piece about the cogitative; after stating that three internal faculties each produce phantasms, namely, the imagination, the memorative power, and the cogitative,[52] he establishes that it is the act of producing phantasms which associates the cogitative to the intellect. He says:

> Moreover, the cogitative power does not have a relationship to the possible intellect, by which man understands, except through its act, by which phantasms are prepared so that they may be made actually intelligible by the agent intellect and perfective of the possible intellect.[53]

Along similar lines he speaks quite emphatically when he comments concerning the passive intellect: "However, without this part of the corporeal soul, the intellect would understand nothing. For it does not understand anything without phantasms."[54] ("Sine hac autem parte animae corporalis, intellectus nihil intelliget. Non enim intelligit aliquid sine phantasmata.")

This passage also suggests that Aristotle and St. Thomas use the term passive intellect as a synonym for the particular reason especially as there is an influence by the lower powers upon the intellect. It has already been seen that Aristotle equates it with the cogitative, memorative, and imagination acting in concert, and St. Thomas musters the same three powers in commenting on their relation to understanding: "For those in whom the imagination and the cogitative and the memorative is [est . . . denoting a single idea in Latin] better disposed are better disposed for understanding."[55] ("Illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum.")

The foregoing, quoted from Question 85, is in the context of a general discussion of the intellect and is offered by St. Thomas without particular reference to speculative or practical orientation. It is evident, however, that the particular reason does furnish data to the intellect which may be used either way, and the original definition of the apprehensive function of the cogitative as a faculty that knows natures suggests that such data is used speculatively.

Nevertheless, the application by the practical intellect is obvious, and very much involved in Dr. Terruwe's teaching. In this the two-fold orientation of the particular reason to the sensory powers and to the

intellect results in a direct as well as an oblique influence on the intellect and to some extent upon the will. St. Thomas shows this in commenting that the intellect necessarily depends upon the lower powers for impressions, so that, if the imagination, memory, or cogitative are upset, the action of the intellect will necessarily be upset.[56]

The cogitative specifying acts of the will and appetites

By contrast, the will can resist the influence of its corresponding appetites on the sensory level.[57] But later in the same article just cited, St. Thomas by contrast discloses the power of the lower cognitive powers, including the cogitative, to move the sense appetites and to influence the will through their influence on intellectual judgement:

> This happens in another way on the part of the will's object, which is the good apprehended by the reason. For the apprehension and judgement of reason is impeded on account of the vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and the judgement of the estimative power, as is obvious in the insane. It is clear, however, that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgement of the estimative follows [sequitur . . . the singular again denoting a collective idea] the passion of the sense appetite. Therefore we see that men under the influence of passion do not easily turn the imagination from those things by which they are influenced. Therefore as a consequence the judgement of reason -- and as a consequence the movement of the will, which is meant to follow the judgement of reason -- generally follows the passion of the sense appetite.[58]

The influence of the cogitative on the irascible has already been discussed, and it evidently happens without any immediate reference to the higher powers of the intellect and will. However, and again in contradistinction to what happens in animals, the particular reason also influences the specification of the acts of the concupiscible as well as those of the irascible, because of its role in reducing the universal judgements of the partical reason to singular conclusions.[59]

This influence, however, is only a political or persuasive dominion which is exercised by the practical intellect or reason, because there are other influences to which the sense appetite may respond; these are the unsubordinated cogitative, the imagination, and sensory impressions.[60] One of these latter may prevail, and the behavioral implications fit in very well with Dr. Terruwe's findings, as will be seen.

The subordinated role of the cogitative is of considerable importance in her doctrine, too, and the reason for this importance is disclosed in St. Thomas' doctrine.

St. Thomas teaches that actions or operations are always directed at particulars, so that they must be instigated either by the cogitative alone as a power proportionate to particulars, or else by the cogitative in subordination to the reason. Here the universal reason functions as the primary cause and the cogitative as the proximate.[61] It is on the physical, sensory level, a sort of mediator between the material and the immaterial.

When the cogitative subordinated to reason specifies acts of the concupiscible appetite, it makes possible concupiscible acts consistent with and invested by the values of the reason. In this, the sensitive appetite is moved by the universal reason, and this occurs through objective causality, that is, by means of the image of the particular reason.[62]

Repression by the cogitative ruling the sense appetite

Thusfar it has been seen that the cogitative in man is located near the psychological bridgehead between the sensory and the intellective, that it bears both upon the utility appetite and the higher powers, and that in man its role in controlling the order of appetitive behavior is not its

sole function, but rather proceeds from the generous scope of its cognitive function under the influence of and influencing intellectual judgement. This all pertains to normal function, and Dr. Terruwe's teaching concurs with St. Thomas, although her principal interest is in its influence on appetitive behavior.

The prominence it finds in her doctrine derives immediately from its position of being influenced by reason and influencing the utility appetite in the genesis of repression. As will be seen, not the least responsible for this genesis is the fact that the power, in its primitive instinctive aestimative form is present in the very young as St. Thomas teaches, and the language with which Dr. Terruwe presents the potential effects of this primitive form are forceful, indeed.

It has been seen that repression usually involves the irascible usurping direction over the concupiscible. Commenting on the role of the cogitative in this, Dr. Terruwe states:

> Therefore, the striving of the utility appetite, and hence also the occurance of repressions, depends on judgements formed by the cogitative power. If the particular reason arrives at an incorrect judgement, . . . it is inevitable that the utility appetite sets the repressive process in motion. Everything, therefore, depends on the correct formation of the particular reason.[63]

She explains this by saying that until puberty the particular reason does not rise much above the instinctive level and is simply incapable of interpreting intellectual values in anything but a sensory fashion, that is, in very much singular, material terms. Thus, if the intellect is given a dominant role too soon, there is a disjunction of emotion and behavior, so that behavior lacks spontaneity and is excessively volitional.

Closely related to this threat, by reason of the child's inability to interpret, is the premature teaching of ideas concerning duty, morals, and religion, since mistakes in the manner of presentation have immediate implications with respect to the utility appetite.[64]

There is an inevitable response of the utility to the rational motives reverberating in the sensory faculty of the particular reason, and in Dr. Terruwe's view this is action in accordance with reason as long as due subordination prevails.[65] She does not in any sense favor the sole domination of intellect and will. But it is when the utility appetite begins to exert on the concupiscible an influence which should be reserved to the reason that trouble emerges, and this is why she so strongly emphasizes the proper development of the power from its estimative state to its mature state as the particular reason:

> The transition from instinct to the particular reason, or the penetration of the purely sensory estimative power by reason, constitutes one of the most important developmental processes of the human mind. A retarded or impaired penetration of the estimative power by reason will result in a psychopathic personality; a precocious or excessive penetration will result in a neurosis.[66]

As has already been seen,[67] the cogitative is influential not only in the generation of neurosis, but in re-enforcing it by means of its informational service to the intellect. Dr. Terruwe explains that it is through the cogitative and the intellect that a person becomes aware of psychological manifestations. As a result the repression may be more persistant in some cases, not because of the strength of the repressing factor itself, but because of its penetration into the mental life and because of the acuity of the cogitative and intellect.

In a not too encouraging passage she says, "The better the intellect and the deeper its introspective power, the greater the awareness of the continued activity of the repressed emotion and hence the need for a continued repression."[68] This intensification of awareness is distinct from the role of the cogitative attaching negative judgements to moves of the concupiscible and enlisting intellectual confirmations by its misrepresentation to the higher faculty in these terms.

Conclusion

It is timely to recall Dr. Terruwe's dictum that repression is impossible when behavior proceeds in the acts of duely subordinated faculties. The foregoing consideration illustrates that in the full scheme of the Thomistic doctrine from which Dr. Terruwe has borrowed, the term due subordination is almost exactly convertible with proper function of the cogitative. This equation borders on oversimplification, especially since it refers to what might be called a mere sense faculty. But its role as a knower of natures and a resonator of intellectual values, while not making it the specifying feature of man, nevertheless means that it specifies much of what he knows and does. The equation seems justified by this and by the Dionysian recognition of its lying at the threshold of the intangible.

The Dignity of the Sensory Life of the Pleasure Appetite

Introduction

The foregoing suggests that the psychological counterpart of St. Thomas' epistomology of Moderate Realism might well be denominated Moderate Materialism. Dr. Terruwe's interpretation of the Thomistic doctrine on the sensory life surely urges it.

In the scholastic tradition, the word concupiscence is one that has hardly been uttered in tones of reverence, and even pleasure has been lent more tolerance than encouragement. These are historically explainable attitudes and to some extent represent charicatures of the teaching of the great scholastics. Nevertheless, there is always the impression that pleasure and what Dr. Terruwe calls the pleasure appetite are aliens, at best naturalized, in the land of reason and will. In view of this, Dr. Terruwe offers a point of view at once resolvable in the Thomistic teachings and at the same time challenging its emphasis on the cognitive and the intellectual.

The impression of this emphasis traces all the way back to Aristotle's singling out of the highest acts of the highest faculties as the componants of the happy and liberal life, and it is re-enforced by the scholastic preoccupation with ranking all the facets of reality, and not the least of all, the faculties and functions of man, as has been seen.

In itself this penchant for classification hardly need be taken as reprehensible, for the essence of scientific, certitudinal knowledge is to know the order of things. But in its train it has drawn attention away from the ordinary and the singular, even though that is where knowledge begins and ends; it has tended to convey the impression that the upward refinement of natures culminating among mortal creatures in the definition of the rational animal is matched by a corresponding upward level of activity or preoccupation, so that the specifying principle of a nature not only furnishes the nature's highest function but also its most frequent, most preoccupying, most sought-after occupation.

However, human life as Dr. Terruwe sees it, is not that cerebral. So it remains to see just where the emphasis in Dr. Terruwe's doctrine lies and how much it concurs with St. Thomas' doctrine. In the analysis of her emphasis on the sense appetite, it is important to recall that neurosis is an appetitive disorder, and that is one reason why early in her book Dr. Terruwe stipulates that "a discussion of the cognitive life is not so important for our purpose . . ."[69] Dr. Terruwe is unequivocal about her interest in the sensory appetitive life, for she says by way of introduction, "We now proceed to the most important part of the present discussion: the theory of the sense appetites."[70] She says this in the context of normal psychology, prior to any consideration of neurosis, although she is working in that direction.

Dr. Terruwe's appreciation of the sensory pleasure appetite stands on two grounds: a rich appreciation of the human sense appetite as invested and ennobled by reason, without in any way forfeiting its essential bodily character, and secondly, her interpretation of the limits within which the irascible is superior to the concupiscible. Both of these are clearly related to the doctrine of subordinated powers and the penetration of the intellect, as has been seen.

Terruwe on the pleasure appetite

Dr. Terruwe's esteem for the human pleasure appetite can best be documented simply by letting her speak for herself in a series of revealing passages:

> We should not forget what we have already explained, namely that man's sensory knowledge of good is colored by his spiritual or intellectual knowledge, and therefore his scale of values of things considered good for the sense appetite will be expanded and ennobled to an immeasurable degree. In this respect, there

> is an essential difference between the pleasure appetite of man and that of animal.[71]

> We can distinguish sensory goods ranging from the most material to the most spiritual, and all can be included under the object of the pleasure appetite.[72]

> This does not mean that we are restricting pleasure to the meaning which is often given to it, namely to indicate simply and solely the gratification of the senses of touch and taste. We refer to what we have explained before, namely, that in man the spiritual pervades and ennobles the entire sensory life, including the pleasure appetite. The most perfect and beautiful human feelings belong to this level of life, and the purest human happiness can be found in these spiritualized sensory objects. What ultimately matters is what man strives for. But when, for all the possible objects which can stimulate his pleasure appetite, he chooses that which is most proper to him as man, it will be only through the subordination of the utility appetite to the pleasure appetite that he can do full justice to his human nature.[73]

These are hardly the views of one given to angelism or to some sort of disembodied humanism. But the question remains, can St. Thomas be accused of such proclivities. The essence of the foregoing passages is an appreciative recognition of the fact that sensory pleasure is proper to man and that it enjoys a specific character of rationality.

Indeed, in another passage, Dr. Terruwe comments, "It is evident that we seek things because they give us pleasure."[74] This signals the probability that her emphasis on the pleasure appetite derives as much from her empirical findings as from a study of Thomism.

Thomistic bias against sensible goods

On the side of parallels between St. Thomas and Dr. Terruwe, there is a noteworthy similarity of her teaching on the redundancy of the intellect in the sensory appetites with an item in St. Thomas' teaching. In

the Summa he comments concerning redundancy:

> I say that the desire for wisdom or other spiritual goods is sometimes called concupiscence either on account of a certain similarity or else on account of the intensity of the appetite of the higher part, from which a redundancy occurs in the lower appetite so that even the lower appetite itself in its own way tends simultaneously toward a spiritual good following upon the higher appetite, and even the body itself serves spiritual things.[75]

Nevertheless, the greater part of St. Thomas' teaching has an orientation or a bias which discloses itself in a tendency to dismiss material sensory goods or to speak of them in a way that carries the implication that to seek sensory goods is contrary to reason, that the good of reason does not include a material good but only intangible ones, that material gain is for the rabble. The following passages are examples of the type of thing which lends itself to this construction:

> To the first I must say that all corporeal things yield to money as far as the multitude of the stupid is concerned, who only know corporeal things which can be had for money. A decision about human goods, however, should not be taken from the stupid, but from wise men.[76]

> To the first therefore it must be said that the philosopher is speaking in connection with men in whom evil takes place because they pursue sensible goods, which are known to the majority, while the good of reason, which is known to the few, is deserted.[77]

> To the third it must be said that in man there is a double nature, namely the rational and the sensitive. And because through the operation of the senses a man arrives at the act of reason, more men follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature than the order of reason. For there are more who attend the beginning of something than who reach the end. So from the fact that they follow the inclination of the sensitive nature, contrary to the order of reason, vices and sins occur in men.[78]

St. Thomas' own teachings can be enlisted to show that the interpretation of these passages need not be as harsh as the wording suggests, that, for instance, there are movements of concupiscence which are in accordance with reason as well as those which are contrary to it. It is rather the tone of such passages which suggests the bias.

Furthermore, this bias is given an intellectual justification in the third question of the Prima Secundae, where St. Thomas works toward the definition of what constitutes true happiness. It should be noted that except for the eighth and final article of the question, the reasoning is not essentially theological, but corresponds rather to Aristotle's doctrine in the first book of the Ethics, that happiness consists in acts of the intellect. Is it then a matter of rejecting the views of these authorities in order to accept Dr. Terruwe's emphasis, or does St. Thomas' bias proceed from the fact that he is talking about something else than Dr. Terruwe is?

The order of nature and the order of lives

St. Thomas furnishes a basis upon which the difficulty can be resolved. As has been seen, the priorities in his own doctrine proceed from an analysis of the order of the various objects, acts, and powers in man. Yet it must be recalled that he specifies that this order is the order of natures, rising from the material through the various grades of the immaterial. But this is not the only way in which the diversity and order of the powers may be analyzed. He teaches that there are three ways of finding order among the powers of the soul, and the first two of these are germane to the present consideration:

> So a triple order must be recognized among them [the powers]. Two of these are considered according to the dependency of one power on another; the third, however, is taken according to an order of objects. The dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways, however: in one way, according to the order of nature, inasmuch as the perfect are naturally prior to the imperfect; in the second way, according to the order of generation and time, as one goes from the imperfect to the perfect.[79]

In his writings St. Thomas proceeds not as a confessor or as a counsellor but as a speculative philosopher and theologian; thus he speaks in terms of the nature of things and assigns priorities strictly on the objective superiority of one nature over another. By contrast, Dr. Terruwe is orientated toward the art of psychiatry, and her theoretical studies are bent toward that clinical goal.

This difference inevitably leads to the recognition that life is not lived on the order of objective natures, but rather on the order of generation and time, as St. Thomas calls it, in which imperfection dominates. While St. Thomas points out the ideal constantly, and this ideal culminates in the highest and most continuous intellective activity possible, this zenith is not readily achieved. His own imposing moral doctrine, to which the entire second part of the Summa is devoted, is ample testimony of his recognition of where the bulk of life for the majority of mankind is lived. And the essence of this doctrine, whatever its overtones, is to be found in the investing of the sensory powers with the values of right reason.

The ideal presented by St. Thomas, even in his moral doctrine, however, inevitably seems to envision a humanity operating at the upper limits of its design specifications, as it were, ever morally disposed for the maximum continuity of cerebrating. This is a viewpoint which is

objectively valid, but which lends itself in the works of imprudent judgement, to precisely the type of intellectual excess which, in Dr. Terruwe's view, generates neurosis. But it is not the doctrine which is at fault; it is the misapprehension that universal speculative truth is immediately applicable to life. Thomism regularly suffers at the hands of this.

Terruwe's response to the speculative

Such application, as has been seen, begets grave and immediate consequences on the irascible's relation to reason and to the pleasure appetite, and it is in connection with this relationship that Dr. Terruwe takes very emphatic exception to the common teaching or the interpretation of the speculative doctrine that the irascible is superior to the pleasure appetite. She states the paradox as it is found in Thomistic teaching:

> In comparing these two powers, the utility appetite is often said to be of a higher rank on the grounds that it is more immaterial. In a certain respect this is true, if we consider that the knowledge of the estimative power, to which the utility appetite corresponds, may be called more immaterial than the direct cognitive power of the external senses. . . . This is sometimes expressed by saying that these faculties -- the estimative power and the utility appetite -- share more the nature of the intellect, which is free of all concrete limitations. True as this may be, however, it does not alter the fact that the utility appetite by nature is directed to the pleasure appetite.[80]

She is perhaps too tactful to say so, but what she is referring to is the expressed teaching of St. Thomas:

> And on account of this it is also clear that the irascible is higher than the concupiscible and nearer to reason. And therefore one who is without restraint because of concupiscence and who observes no law is more shameful than an enraged man who observes norms, even if perverse, as is said in the seventh book of the Ethics (1149a 24.).[81]

> Wherefore, the irascible is nearer to reason and will than the concupiscible is. And on account of this, one incontinent of anger, as being less deprived of reason, is less shameful than one incontinent in matters of concupiscence, as the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics. Therefore it is clear from the foregoing that the irascible and concupiscible are different powers and what is the object of each, and how the irascible aids the concupiscible, and that it is superior and more worthy than it just as is the estimative among the other apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.[82]

In the foregoing passages, the term turpis, shameful, is rather strong language, although one might wonder how important a value shamefulness is, judging from St. Thomas' own relish for such things as urine as examples in his teachings. Whatever that may be, it is worth noting that he implicitly says that rage is shameful, since concupiscence is more shameful.

Dr. Terruwe's quarrel is not with what St. Thomas says, provided that it is taken on his terms and as the word of one writing as a theoretician. In his view, the irascible aids the concupiscible as a superior, a protector; propugnatrix is his word. In the order of nature, this is quite understandable, but in the order of generation and nature, where life is lived, Dr. Terruwe sees the order otherwise: "Although the utility appetite may be more spiritual in the sense explained above, the pleasure appetite remains the primary factor in mental life."[83]

Perhaps in the context of faculties taking priority over faculties, the ultimate operating perspective must be supplied by Dr. Terruwe's caveat as she concludes her teaching on normal psychology and embarks on a discussion of repression:

> However, to prevent misunderstanding, we want to add one more remark. Although in the following pages we shall speak repeatedly of the operations of various faculties, we must always

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> remember that these faculties belong to one subject, man himself, who acts by means of these faculties. But it is always man or the person who knows, strives, and moves, and not the faculty alone.[84]

This again is a recourse to the order of generation and time, which is where the psychiatrist and his patient work; it is particularly opposite to this order that the educational implications of Dr. Terruwe's emphasis on the pleasure appetite are found. In her words:

> As a consequence, the main accent in the sensory mental life must naturally rest on the pleasure appetite and not on the utility appetite. When the emphasis is shifted to the utility appetite, it results in a disharmony of the emotional life with possible disasterous consequences to the mental life.[85]

> The neurosis is a disorder caused by an abnormal condition in man's sensory appetitive life wherein the emotions fail to receive their natural guidance from the intellect because of the interference and repressing action of the irascible emotions.[86]

> It is in the developmental years of the child that the proper relationship between the different appetitive faculties must be preserved, the pleasure appetite must be able to grow unhindered, and the emotions of the utility appetite (fear and energy) must be held in check, so that at the proper time the rational will assume its task of providing truely adult and mature guidance of the emotions.[87]

Conclusion

These are not absolutely new ideas; as indicated above, they are reminiscent of Aristotle's dicta on emotional formation. But conversely, neither are they non-Thomistic. They are, one might say, refreshingly different from the spartan ideals of "self-control" thrust upon the very young by over-zealous elders. But the Thomism of Dr. Terruwe's views lies very much in recognizing the role of the utility appetite serving the interests of the concupiscible; it lies equally in a decent respect for

the sensory life of the pleasure appetite, understood as experienced in the order of generation and time, notwithstanding its ultimate orientation and realization in finding correspondance with the order of objective natures.

The development of this theme in Dr. Terruwe's book suggests that the phrase, "the sensory life of the pleasure appetite," is quite necessarily composed of two terms, the sensory life and of the pleasure appetite. The latter term reflects the outcome of the dialectic, traced in this study, of the utility appetite with the pleasure appetite in human development. The former bespeaks the irrefutable animality of man's nature receptive to reason but finding its environment in the material world.

CHAPTER IV

THE EPILOGUE

This critique set out to document the Thomistic sources of Dr. Terruwe's work and to analyze the differences between her writings and those of St. Thomas Aquinas. Conclusions relating to these objectives have been drawn from place to place as the progress of the critique called for them. It now remains to express some implications of these considerations.

Social Implications

It is commonplace to see analogies between the individual man and mankind at large; teaching which emphasizes the irascible appetite restraining concupiscence has historically been institutionalized in civil states which were or are authoritarian, paternalistic, or totalitarian. By contrast, a doctrine wherein the utility appetite operates within reasoned limits in the service of the pleasure appetite finds social expression in civil states in which the coercive, punitive, and defensive forces are subordinated to individual interest and liberty. The contemporary concern about the role of the "military-industrial complex" reflects the tension mounted when this kind of emphasis is disputed in a state. The "law and order" issue is another obvious example of this. It all invests Dr. Terruwe's teaching and her interpretation of St. Thomas with an extended meaning.

Scientific Implications

In addition to the social implications of Dr. Terruwe's writings, there are equally obvious scientific and clinical ones, and these are naturally the ones which she intended. The clinical potential of her resolution of empirical psychiatric findings in rational psychology can only be properly evaluated by a clinician. For that reason, this critique has not dwelt on the clinical side of her investigations.

This reflects the dilemma, reflected, if overstated by Simon, which is so often involved in interdisciplinary studies: it is very difficult for one person to become expert in two fields, and the more so when one is a speculative science or philosophical discipline, and the other is a profession, that is, an occupation possessing speculative knowledge and the art of applying it. Related studies often approach each other as arcs rising toward one another but failing to arch for want of a keystone. Dr. Terruwe is one of the keystone persons, sufficiently learned in psychiatry and rational psychology to close the distance between the two. This is an enormously important capability, and her writing contributes to both fields.

Thus, she has not only advanced psychiatric practice but has taken a step to move rational psychology on the way to what she considers its unfinished business. The perameters for this deserve quoting here:

> The study of rational psychology is completely ignored in our medical schools. This is unfortunate both for medical science and for rational psychology: for medical science, because an understanding of the facts, even a tentative understanding, will indicate the direction which the positive investigations ought to take; for rational psychology, because a better knowledge of the facts leads to a deeper and more exact understanding of their nature. For we must remember that rational psychology, too, is

> a science which is still in the stage of development. Its principles are based on the most elementary and most definite observations and they are incontestable, but there are many particular aspects which remain to be clarified and completed. For example, modern research in depth electroencephalography may contribute considerably to an understanding of the localization and function of the internal senses.[1]

Philosophical Implications

If the kind of work which Dr. Terruwe has done meets the disciplinary difficulties of mastering the sheer bulk of subject matter subsumed under the titles, "Psychiatry," and "Rational Psychology," she does, nevertheless, present a work which implicitly supports the contention of Fernandez-Alanso and his school concerning the unity of philosophy and the sciences. Indeed, in the passage quoted above, Terruwe's identification of rational psychology as "a science," is strikingly affirmative. If no one would construe it as science in a Copernican sense, then she must be using it in the certitudinal sense of Aristotle, and that itself is a leap, even if she does elsewhere distinguish science and philosophy.

This line of thought concerning science and philosophy is complicated by the fact that some schools would deny that rational psychology is a part of philosophy at all. But for those which do assign it a place in philosophy, the contributions of Dr. Terruwe to the dialogue or the union of the sciences and philosophy is provocative and encouraging.

With specific reference to the Thomistic school, one of the more conspicuous avenues opened by her emphasis on the cogitative and the respective relationships of the pleasure and utility appetites is to re-examine and to extend the Thomistic ethical positions. The Thomist has a particularly adaptable discipline within which to do this, since his school considers both ethics and rational psychology as parts of

philosophy, and because they have a specific connection with each other. This consists in the fact that ethics is subalternate to psychology because it adds to psychology's subject, namely, living and human behavior, the accidental difference of morality, and because it borrows principles from psychology.[2]

This avenue opens up to questions of the cardinal virtues, but beyond them in theological considerations are the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and their analogies with natural human emotions may also be enriched with the insights and emphases found in Dr. Terruwe's interpretation of St. Thomas.

Finally, because she does interpret St. Thomas and offers the differences of emphasis which have been considered above, Dr. Terruwe's study excites a renewed appreciation of his work and it testifies to the wealth of his doctrine which is to be found if reading is not limited to the Summa Theologiae.

FOOTNOTES

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18. Edward Quinlisk Franz, The Thomistic Doctrine on the Possible Intellect, The Catholic University of America Philosophical Series, Vol. CXVII (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950), p. 149.

19. Franz, p. 149.

20. Maritain, p. 25.

21. Kane, p. 133.

22. Kane, p. 132.

23. Kane, p. 167.

24. Kane, pp. 167-168.

25. Kane, p. 169.

26. Kane, p. 132.

27. Kane, p. 133.

28. Kane, p. 124.

29. Kane, p. 134.

30. Simon, p. 161.

31. Simon, pp. 162-163.

32. Simon, pp. 161-162.

33. Simon, pp. 163-164.

34. Simon, pp. 162-163.

35. Simon, pp. 164-166.

36. Simon, p. 172.

37. Franz, p. 152.

38. Simon, p. 170.

39. Simon, p. 161.

40. Kane, p. 127.

41. Kane, pp. 137-138.

42. Simon, pp. 180-181.

43. Terruwe, p. 23.

44. Ibid., p. 45.

45. Ibid., p. 39.

46. Ibid., pp. 28 & 35.

47. Terruwe, pp. 14-15.

48. Ibid., p. 34.

49. Terruwe, pp. 37 & 40.

50. Ibid., p. 39.

Chapter II

1. Cecil Alec Mace, "Johann Friedrich Herbart," Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1963), XI, p. 476.

2. Terruwe, p. 5.

3. Terruwe, p. 5.

4. Terruwe, pp. 4-5.

5. It may be observed here that Dr. Terruwe quite freely uses the term powers interchangeably with faculties, as on p. 7. The former term relates derivatively to St. Thomas' term, which is potentia. It is clear that Dr. Terruwe intends the same thing by faculties and powers as St. Thomas does with potentia, which Thomistic translators often transliterate with potency. Nevertheless, St. Thomas employs the term potentia - potency somewhat more widely than faculty is used. For whereas faculty is usually used in connection with cognitive and appetitive phenomena, St. Thomas includes even nutritive powers in his sense of potentia, as in Summa Theologiae, I., 77, 4, corp. Dr. Terruwe does admit this meaning, but she assigns a lesser degree of importance to the nutritive and locomotive powers, as may be seen on pp. 5 and 20.

6. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Soul (a translation of Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima), trans. John Patrick Rowan (St. Louis, B. Herder, 1949), p. 160.

7. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis de Anima Commentarium, ed. Angelus M. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1936), II, 5, 279.

8. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Petrus Caramello (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950), I, 77, 1 et seq.

9. II In de Anima, 5, 279.

10. Ibid., 279.

11. Ibid., 285.

12. Ibid., 286.

13. Terruwe, p. 23.

14. Q. de Anima, 13, and Summa Theol., I, 78, 1 corp.

15. Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Fribourg-Barcelona: Herder, 1953), # 427.

16. Summa Theol., I, 77, 6, note: "Facultates sive organicae sive inorganicae sive inorganicae, 'ex anima humana per naturalem resultantiam emanant.' "

17. Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. II, c. 3.

18. I. 78, 3, corp.

19. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4, corp.

20. Terruwe, p. 10.

21. Ibid., p. 8.

22. Ibid., p. 6.

23. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

24. Summa Theol., I, 77, 4, corp. and Q. de An., 13 ad 10.

25. Terruwe, p. 6.

26. Ibid., p. 7.

27. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

28. Summa Theol., I-II, 46, 6 ad 1.

29. Terruwe, pp. 12-13.

30. Ibid., p. 16.

31. Terruwe, p. 20.

32. Ibid., p. 24.

33. Ibid., p. 27.

34. Summa Theol., I. 38, 3, corp.

35. Terruwe, p. 35.

36. III In de Anima, 16, 814: Et iste est naturalis ordo, ut superior appetitus moveat inferiorem . . . ; appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retineat, movetur tamen naturali ordine, motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis. Si autem e converso accidit, quod appetitus superior transmoveatur ab inferiori, hoc est praeter ordinem naturalem. Unde et hoc facit peccatum in moribus, sicut peccata sunt monstra in natura.

37. Terruwe, p. 195.

38. Terruwe, p. 28.

39. Terruwe, p. 28.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Terruwe, p. 136.

43. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4 ad 5: Dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis, sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.

44. Summa Theol., III, 19, 2, corp.

45. Summa Theol., I-II, 50, 4, corp. and 59, 4 ad 2.

46. II Sent, 20, 2, ad 5.

47. Terruwe, p. 186.

48. Ibid., p. 185.

49. Politics, Bk. VIII, cc. 5-7.

50. Terruwe, p. 7.

51. Ibid., p. 9.

52. Ibid., p. 8.

53. Ibid., pp. 7 & 11.

54. Ibid., p. 8.

55. Summa Theol., I, 78, 8 ad 5.

56. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate (Qu. Disput., vol. I, ed. Raymundus Spiazzi, O.P. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1953) 15, 2 ad 7.

57. Terruwe, p. 7.

58. III In de Anima, 4, 633.

59. Ibid., 632.

60. Ibid., 16, 841.

61. Franz, pp. 22-23. It should be noted that while these terms, spiritual and immaterial are sometimes used interchangeably, they are not synonyms in Thomistic doctrine. Thus, the implications of the intellect's being both spiritual and immaterial may be seen in the following passage from Franz:

> "In the animal kingdom there are various degrees of immateriality, but in no sense can there be said to be degrees of spirituality, because the souls of animals are not subsistent per se, i.e., they are intrinsically dependent upon matter for their existence and all their operations. Immateriality as the root of cognition does not mean independence from primary matter, therefore. However, spirituality does.
>
> "In man himself, because he is composed of body and soul, there are degrees of both immateriality and spirituality. The lowest sense faculties have the lowest degree of immateriality because their nature and objects are more restricted. The highest internal sense functions, on the other hand, have such a high degree of immateriality that they border very close to the spiritual although never actually attaining this. There is an absolute gap between the highest degree of immateriality and the lowest degree of spirituality, since the former involves an intrinsic dependence upon the potentiality of primary matter, whereas the latter demands intrinsic independence.
>
> "In the realm of spiritual creatures, the lowest degree of spirituality is embraced by the possible intellect because of its greatest potentiality, thus requiring the greater number of species. This is another way of stating that the existential and intentional realms of intellect must correspond. In both realms the possible intellect is immaterial because it is spiritual. This is what Aristotle meant when he called the intellect "separate," as St. Thomas tells us (Com. in De Anima, III, 1.7.). The term separate signifies that the possible intellect is spiritual, not that it is a separated substance as Averroes held. The same may be said for the active intellect, against Avicenna."

62. Terruwe, p. 24.

63. Summa Theol., I-II, 74, 4 ad 1.

64. Ibid., 50, 3, corp.

65. Ibid., I, 77, 5, corp. and Terruwe, pp. 6 & 15.

66. Q. de An, 13, ad 19, and Terruwe, pp. 4, 8, & 30.

67. Terruwe, p. 4.

68. II In de Anima, 6, 304.

69. Terruwe, p. 5.

70. Summa Theol., I, 77, 3 ad 4.

71. Terruwe, p. 24.

72. The Soul, p. 155.

73. Terruwe, p. 4.

74. II In de Anima, 6, 300-301.

75. de Ver, 10, 1 ad 1.

76. Terruwe, p. 7.

77. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

78. Terruwe, p. 11.

79. II In de An., 6, 305-307: Sic igitur objecta sunt priora operationibus animae in via definiendi. Unde et prius oportebit determinare de objectis quam de actibus, propter eamdem causam, propter quam et de actibus prius determinatur quam de potentiis. Objecta autem sunt sicut alimentum respectu vegitativae, et sensibile respectu sensus, et intelligitile respectu intellectus. Sed sciendum est, quod ex objectis diversis non diversificantur actus et potentiae animae, nisi quando fuerit differentia objectorum inquantum sunt objecta, id est, secundum rationem formalem objecti, sicut visibile et audibile.

80. II In de An. 6, 304.

81. Ibid., 305.

82. Summa Theol., I, 77, 3, corp.

83. de Ver, 15, 2, corp.

84. de Ver, 15, 2, corp.

85. The Soul, p. 165.

86. de Ver., 16, 1, ad 13.

87. Gredt, # 653.

88. de Ver., 16, 1, ad 13: Non distinguitur potentia activa a passiva ex hoc quod habet operationem, quia, cum cujuslibet potentiae animae tam activae quam passivae sit operatio aliqua, quaelibet potentia animae esset activa. Cognoscitur autem earum distinctio per comparationem potentiae ad objectum. Si enim objectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converso se habeat ut agens et movens, sice erit potentia passiva. Et ide est quod omnes potentiae animae vegetabilis sunt activae, quia alimentum transmutatur per potentiam animae tam in nutriendo quam in generando. Sed potentiae sensitivae omnes sunt passivae, quia per sensibilia objecta moventur et fiunt actu. Circa intellectum vero aliqua potentia est activa, aliqua passiva.

89. Summa Theol., I, 82, 4, corp.

90. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, vol. II, ed. Ceslaus Pera, O.P., Petrus Marc, O.S.B., & Petrus Caramello (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1961), 25, 1010.

91. The Soul, pp. 154-155.

92. Summa Theol., I, 78, 1, corp.

93. Terruwe, p. 25.

94. Ibid.

95. Terruwe, p. 24.

96. Ibid., p. 186.

97. Terruwe, p. 8.

98. Ibid., p. 25.

99. c.f. Franz, p. 21: The agent intellect is immaterial in the same sense that the possible intellect is. Nevertheless, according to St. Thomas they are two really distinct but inseparable faculties.

100. Ibid., p. 9.

101. Terruwe, p. 10.

102. Ibid., p. 9.

103. Ibid., p. 34.

104. Ibid., p. 19.

105. Ibid., p. 30.

106. Ibid., p. 11.

107. Ibid., p. 105.

108. St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, O.P. & M. F. Moos, O.P. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929-1933), III, dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2, # 23.

109. III. Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 3, # 27.

110. II, 15, 396-398.

111. "Hujusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium. Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva; vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui conjungitur."

112. Cont. Gent., II, 73, 1503: "Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, quo intellegit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem."

113. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2, # 24: "Auia autem, ut dicit Dionysius, 7 cap. De Divin. Nomin., 'Divina sapientia conjungit fines primorum principiis secundorum' quia omnis natura inferior in sui suprema attingit ad infinitum natura superioris, secundum quod participat aliquid de natura superioris, quamvis deficienter; ideo tam in apprehensione quam in appetitu sensitivo invenitur aliquid in quo sensitivum rationem attingit."

114. III In de Anima, 16, 844: "Et similiter appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retineat, movetur tamen naturali ordine, motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis."

115. Summa Theol., I-II, 74, 4, ad 1: "Dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur: sicut nos, prae aliis animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et reminiscentiam . . . Et per hunc modum etiam appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi."

116. III In de Anima, 4, 635.

117. Summa Theol., I-II, 30, 3, ad 3.

118. Contra Gent., II, 60, 1373.

119. III In de Anima, 16, 846.

120. III In de Anima, 16, 846: "Illa quae est universalis, movet ut causa prima et quiescens, particularis vero ut causa proxima, et quodammodo motui applicata. Nam operationes et motus in particularibus sunt; unde oportet ad hoc quod motus sequatur, quod opinio universalis ad particularia applicetur."

121. Ibid., 840-841.

122. Summa Theol., I, 81, 3, corp.

123. Summa Theol., I-II, 50, 3, corp.

124. Ibid., ad 1: "Sed vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis: et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur."

125. Summa Theol., I-II, 50, 3 ad 3.

126. Ibid., 51, 2 corp.

127. Gredt, # 463.

128. Ibid., # 473.

129. Terruwe, p. 40.

130. Ibid., p. 47.

131. Terruwe, p. 48.

132. Summa Theol., I-II, 9, 1, corp.

133. Ibid., 9, 2, corp.

134. Ibid., 10, 3, corp: "Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret."

135. Summa Theol., I-II, 27, 2, corp.

136. Ibid., I-II, 43, 1, corp: "Respondeo dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales: quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis: vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens, coniunctum: cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per

modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum.

137. II In de Anima, 19, 481-486.

138. Terruwe, p. 200.

139. Terruwe, pp. 51-52.

Chapter III

1. Terruwe, pp. 11-12.

2. Ibid., p. 16.

3. Terruwe, p. 10.

4. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

5. de Ver., 26, 4.

6. I-II, 26, 1, corp.

7. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

8. de Ver., 26, 4, ad 1.

9. Summa Theol., I-II, 23, 1, corp.

10. III Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2 corp.

11. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4.

12. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 1.

13. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4, corp: "Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta."

14. Summa Theol., I, 81, 2 ad 2: "Sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis."

15. III In de Anima, 14, 804: "Aliquid autem habet rationem boni et appetibilis, inquantum perficitur delectabilibus, quasi habens facultatem ad libitum etendi eis; et ad hoc ordinatur irascibilis, quae est quasi propugnatrix concupiscibilis."

16. Ibid., 805.
17. Summa Theol., I-II, 23, 1 ad 1.
18. Summa Theol., I-II, 45, 2, corp.
19. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.
20. Ibid., ad 2.
21. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1.
22. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2, corp.
23. de Ver., 25, 2, corp.
24. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 & 5.
25. Terruwe, p. 12.
26. I In de Anima, I, 1, 3.
27. Terruwe, p. 22.
28. Terruwe, p. 23.
29. Ibid.
30. Summa Theol., I-II, 40, 3, corp.
31. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2.
32. II In de Anima, 13, 396-398.
33. II In De Anima, 15, 396.
34. Ibid., 398.
35. II In de Anima, 398.
36. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2, corp.
37. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4, corp.
38. Ibid., 81, 2 ad 2.
39. III In de Anima, 4, 635.
40. Terruwe, p. 9; II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.
41. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4 ad 5.

42. II Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

43. Terruwe, p. 9.

44. II In de Anima, 15, 396: "Hujusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium."

45. Summa Theol., I, 81, 3, corp: "Loco autem aestimativae virtutis in homine, sicut supra dictum est, est vis cogitativa: quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unda ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus."

46. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2, corp: "Sed quod apprehendat illas intentiones quae non cadunt sub sensu sicut amicitiam, odium, et huiusmodi, hoc est sensitivae partis secundum quod attingit rationem. Unde para illa in hominibus, in quibus est perfectior propter conjunctionem ad animam rationalem, dicitur ratio particularis, quia confert de intentionibus particularibus; in aliis autem animalibus, quia non confert, sed ex instinctu naturali habet hujusmodi intentiones apprehendere, non dicitur ratio sed aestimatio."

47. Summa Theol., I-II, 78, 4, corp: "Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est: nam alia animalia percipiunt hujusmodi intentiones solum naturali quadam instinctu, homo autem per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam hujusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis; . . . est enim collativea intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium."

48. Ibid., 51, 3, corp.

49. Summa Theol., I, 78, 4, corp.

50. Q. de Anima, 13.

51. Gredt, # 26.

52. II Contra Gentes, 73, 1501.

53. Ibid., 1503: "Adhuc. Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum, quo praeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem."

54. III In de An., 10, 745.

55. Summa Theol., I, 85, 7, corp.

56. Summa Theol., I, 115, 4, corp.

57. Ibid.

58. Summa Theol., I-II, 77, 1, corp: "Alio modo, ex parte objecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis et iudicium virtutis aestimativae: ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae. . . . Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est sequi iudicium rationis."

59. Ibid., I, 83, 3, corp.

60. Ibid., 83, 3, ad 2.

61. III In de Anima, 16, 846, and II Contra Gent., 60, 1373.

62. Summa Theol., I-II, 30, 3 ad 3.

63. Terruwe, p. 105.

64. Terruwe, p. 105.

65. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

66. Terruwe, pp. 10-11.

67. Terruwe, p. 50.

68. Terruwe, p. 50.

69. Terruwe, p. 6.

70. Ibid., p. 11.

71. Terruwe, p. 14.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 19.

74. Ibid., p. 12.

75. Summa Theol., I-II, 30, 1 ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam: vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat."

76. Summa Theol., I-II, 21, 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus."

77. Summa Theol., I, 63, 9 ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur quantum ad homines in quibus malum contingit ex hoc quod sequuntur bona sensibilia, quae sunt pluribus nota, deserto bono rationis, quod paucioribus notum est."

78. Ibid., I-II, 71, 2 ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae quam ordinem rationis; plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis."

79. Summa Theol., I, 77, 4, corp: "Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerentur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera: tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem objectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur."

80. Terruwe, p. 19.

81. III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 2. corp: "Et propter hoc patet etiam quod irascibilis est altior quam concupiscibilis et propinquior rationi. Et ideo incontinens propter concupiscentiam, qui nulla lege utitur, magis est turpis quam iracundus, qui utitur legibus sed perversis, ut dicitur VII Eth."

82. de Ver., 25, 2, corp: "Unde irascibilis est propinquior rationi et voluntati quam concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc incontinens irae est minus turpis quam incontinens concupiscentiae, utpote minus privatus ratione, ut dicit philosophus in II Ethic. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt diversae potentiae et quid est objectum utriusque et quomodo irascibilis iuvat concupiscibilem, et est superior et dignior ea sicut aestimativa inter ceteras apprehensivas virtutes sensitivae partis."

83. Terruwe, p. 19.

84. Terruwe, pp. 30-31.

85. Terruwe, pp. 18-19.

86. Ibid., p. 184.

87. Ibid., p. 185.

Chapter IV

1. Terruwe, p. xxi.

2. Gredt, # 224, 228, & 879.

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